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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
There are two questions presented for review:
1.

Whether the applicability of Section 78-40-2, Utah

Code Ann. (1953), may be raised for the first time on appeal.
2.

Whether a Utah general partnership, through its

managing partner who has both actual and constructive notice of a
pending quiet title action affecting seven acres of real property
subject to an executory real estate contract, can continue to
make payments on that property and acquire legal title to the
property, while the quiet title action is still pending, from an
interloper

whose

interest

in the seven acres is directly

challenged in the quiet title action and whose interest is
ultimately stipulated by the managing partner, through his
attorney, to be nothing and judgment is entered accordingly.
The panel of the Court of Appeals has tacitly decided
that the applicability of Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953),
may not be raised for the first time on appeal.

This tacit

decision is in conflict with Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline
Construction, 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988).
Furthermore, the panel of the Court of Appeals has
tacitly decided that one who continues to make payments on real
property

subject to an executory real estate contract and

acquires legal title to that property, while the quiet title
action is still pending, from an interloper whose interest in the

property is directly challenged in the quiet title action and
whose interest is ultimately determined to be nothing, acquires
that legal title to the property regardless of the disposition of
that property made by the trial court.

This tacit decision is in

conflict with these decisions of the Utah Supreme Court:
Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300 (Utah 1982);
Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills, 590 P.2d
1244 (Utah 1979); and
Glynn v. Dubin, 369 P.2d 930 (Utah 1962).
This tacit decision is also in conflict with this decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals:
Biodgett v. Zions First National Bank, 752 P. 2d 901
(Utah App. 1988) .
This tacit decision seriously affects the integrity of
judicial proceedings in rem.

Property which is before the trial

court for disposition can be validly alienated away by one before
the court whose interest is ultimately determined to be nothing
to another who has both actual and constructive notice of those
in rem proceedings while those proceedings are still pending.
CITATION TO OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals
can be found at 146 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (Utah App. 1990).

2

JURISDICTION STATEMENT
The decision of the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals
was entered in this case on October 19, 1990.
requested*

No rehearing was

No order granting an extension of time within which

to petition for certiorari has been entered.
Section 78-2-2(b), Utah Code Ann. (1989), is believed
to confer jurisdiction upon the Utah Supreme Court to review the
decision in question by a writ of certiorari.
CONTROLLING STATUTE
Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides:
In any action affecting the title to, or
the right of possession of, real property the
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint
or thereafter, and the defendant at the time
of filing his answer when affirmative relief
is claimed in such answer, or at any time
afterward, may file for record with the
recorder of the county in which the property
or some part thereof is situated a notice of
the pendency of the action, containing the
names of the parties, the object of the
action or defense, and a description of the
property in that county affected thereby.
From the time of filing such notice for
record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer
of the property affected thereby be deemed to
have constructive notice of the pendency of
the action, and only of its pendency against
parties designated by their real names.
(Emphasis added*)

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an action to quiet title to seven acres of real

property located in Summit County, Utah.
B.

Course of Proceedings
On April 6, 1983, Steven W. Major ("Weber")1 filed

1.

a complaint to quiet title to eleven parcels of real estate
located in Summit County.
Utah

general

Snyderville West ("Snyderville"), a

partnership,

and

Jim

Gaddis

("Gaddis"),

Snyderville' s managing partner, were two of seventy named
defendants.

(R. 0001-0021; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40)
2.

On April 11r 1983, Weber recorded a Lis Pendens

describing the eleven parcels of real property.

By Order entered

March 19, 1990, Judge Regnal W. Garff of the Utah Court of
Appeals granted Plaintiff/Appellant fs Motion to Supplement the
Record

to include the lis pendens.

The seven acres were

described as Parcel 6 in the Lis Pendens.

(R. 0664-0682: 1 4;

Appendix wA,f hereto)

1. Steven W. Major died and Brenda Major Weber was named as
successor Personal Representative in 1984.
(R. 0378-0383; 146
Utah Adv. Rep. at 43, ft. 1)

4

3.

By order dated December 17, 1983, the trial court

allowed service by publication upon Snyderville and sixteen other
named defendants.

Counsel for Weber could not determine the

identity of any agent to serve on Snyderville*s behalf,

(R.

0264-0282; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41 and 43, ft. 6)
4.

The trial court entered a default judgment against

Snyderville on August 29, 1985.

(R. 0432-0435, 0444-0454; 146

Utah Adv. Rep. at 41)
5.

On October 2, 1985, following lengthy negotiations

among twenty-six of the developer defendants, Gaddis, through his
attorney, entered into a complex Stipulation for Settlement
providing that the seven acres vest in Weber.
6.

On January 17, 1986, Judgment was entered quieting

title to the seven acres in Weber.
Exhibit n C M thereto; R. 0837-0966:
C.

(R. 0479-0525)

(R. 0552-0572:

If 2 and 3-

ff 8, 11 and 12)

Disposition in The Lower Courts
1.

In the fall of 1988, Snyderville sought to have

the default judgment against it set aside.
09 77; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41)

(R. 0573-0633, 0637-

The district court determined

that there was "no adequate explanation . . . [for the] failure
to personally serve Snyderville West at its known tax address"
and set aside the judgment.

(R. 0979-0989; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at

41)
5

2.

In 1989, Snyderville filed a Motion to Dismiss

premised on Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6),
which was granted.
3.

(R. 0996-1022; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41)

This appeal followed.

(R. 1023-1029; 146 Utah

Adv. Rep. at 41)
4.

A panel of the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the

trial court, holding that:

1) service of process upon Jim Gaddis

in his individual capacity did not effect service of process
upon, nor confer jurisdiction over, Snyderville; 2) service by
publication was inappropriate where no personal inquiry was made
at Snydervillefs last known address within the state; 3) since
service by publication on Snyderville was not warranted, such
service

was

not

sufficient

to confer

jurisdiction

over

Snyderville and the default judgment against it was void; and 4)
Weber raised no argument demonstrating error in dismissal on Rule
12(b)(5) grounds.
5.

(146 Utah Adv. Rep. 40-43)

The panel found no merit in Weber's lis pendens

argument, raised for the first time in her reply brief.

(146

Utah Adv. Rep. at 43, ft. 3)
D.

Statement of Relevant Facts
1.

percent

From 1978 to the present, Gaddis has held a ten

interest

in Snyderville and has been its managing

6

(R. 0664-0682: %% 1 and 2; R. 1031: 11-14; R. 0582-

partner.

0633, Exhibit "A" thereto (R. 0598); 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40)
2.

For $120,000, in 1978, Snyderville purchased from

Investor Associates seven acres, a portion of the property at
issue in the quiet title action.

Robert W. Major {"Major")

executed the pertinent real estate contract on behalf of Investor
Associates.

Major died

on March

20, 1980.

Immediately

thereafter, Joseph L. Krofchek ("Krofchelc"), an interloper,
purportedly transferred to himself all right, title and interest
in property belonging to Investor Associates, including the seven
acres.

Snyderville took possession of the seven acres in 1978

and made timely payments until Major's death; thereafter,
payments continued, albeit to different payees, with the final
payment of $32,210.10 being made on July 10, 1983.

In October

1983, Snyderville recorded a warranty deed for the seven acres
given to it by Joseph L. Krofchek.

In the quiet title action

Krofchek's interest was directly challenged and was ultimately
stipulated by Gaddis, through his attorney to be nothing.

(R.

0001-0021:

23-

11 1, 8-10, 14-17 Exhibit "B" thereto; R. 1031:

30, Exhibits 3, 6, 7 and 8 thereto; R. 0479-0525, 0552-0572,
0526-0551; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40)
3.

Weber paid the real property taxes on the seven

acres for the years 1986 and 1987.
7

(R. 0664-0682:

1 12;

R. 0653-0658:

% 3)

When it paid the real property taxes in

1987, Snyderville learned that the trial court had divested it of
title by means of the default judgment against it.

(R. 0600; 146

Utah Adv. Rep. at 40)
4.

From the time it took possession of the subject

property in 1978, Snyderville1s address had been correctly listed
as Gaddisfs office address on the Summit County tax records.

(R.

0274, 0279, 0600, 0992, 0995; R. 1030: 38-39; R. 1031: 13-14; 146
Utah Adv. Rep. at 40-41)
5.

No filing in the appropriate county or state

offices revealed the name of any individual affiliated with
Snyderville nor did Snyderville have a telephone directory
listing.

Although Gaddis was served in his individual capacity

at his office on May 11, 1983, the summons served upon him was
directed to him individually and made no reference to Snyderville
except in the lengthy caption listing all seventy defendants.
The return of service indicated that Gaddis had been served
personally and did not purport that service on Snyderville had
been effected through him.

By order dated December 17, 1983, the

trial court allowed service by publication upon Snyderville and
sixteen other named defendants.

(R. 1031: 13-15, 22, 32-33,

Exhibit 11 thereto; R. 0664-0682: 1 3; R. 0731-0825, Exhibit "A"
thereto; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41)
8

6.

As a corollary to service by publication, counsel

for Weber prepared a summons for mailing to Snyderville at its
tax address, i.e., Gaddisfs office at 1253 East 2100 South in
Salt Lake City.
7.

(R. 1030: 50-54; 146 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41)

The affidavit of mailing listed Snydervillefs

address as "1253 East 7100 South," incorrectly stating the south
coordinate by fifty blocks.

Although there is no such address,

and, according to a Postal Service supervisor's affidavit, the
summons directed to Snyderville should have been returned by the
Postal Service, counsel for Weber did not recall that the summons
had been returned, although other summonses were returned.

The

Postal Service does not keep records of returned first class mail
and it is therefore unknown if the mailed summons ever reached
Snyderville.

Gaddis had no recollection of receiving a summons

through the mail.

(R. 0300-0330, 1 4(e); R. 1030: 13, 54-55; R.

0714-0715; R. 0600; R. 1031: 44-45; R. 0736-0737; 146 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 41)
8.

The trial court entered a default judgment against

Snyderville on August 29, 1985.
Stipulation

Pursuant to negotiations and the

for Settlement entered by Gaddis, through his

attorney, on January 26, 1986, Judgment was entered quieting
title to the seven acres in Weber.

In the fall of 1988,

Snyderville sought to have the judgment set aside.
9

The district

court determined that there was "no adequate explanation . . .
[for the] failure to personally serve Snyderville West at its
known tax address" and set aside the judgment.

In 1989,

Snyderville filed a Motion to Dismiss premised on Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), which was granted.

This appeal followed.

(See %% B.4, B.5, B.6, C.l, C.2 and C.3 hereinabove - Course of
Proceedings and Disposition In The Lower Courts)
9.

On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Weber

claimed that Snyderville was effectively served through personal
service upon Jim Gaddis or, alternatively, that it was properly
served by publication.

Weber challenged the trial court's order

of dismissal in favor of Snyderville as improper under Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a).

In her reply brief, Weber also claimed that

Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), was determinative of the
action.

(See %% C*4 and C*5 hereinabove - Disposition in The

Lower Courts)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE APPLICABILITY OF A STATUTE MAY
BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL.
In Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction,
754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988), Judge Orme addressed whether a
statute's inapplicability could be raised for the first time on
10

appeal.

Together with Judge Bench and Judge Howard, Judge Orme

wrote:
. Appellants have raised for the
first time on appeal the inapplicability of
the procurement code. Ordinarily, arguments,
positions, and issues may not be raised for
the first time on a p p e a l .
See, e.g.,
Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah
1983); Conder v. A. L. Williams & Assocs.,
Inc. , 739 P.2d 634, 637 n.2 (Utah Ct. App.
1987. That doctrine is not, however, applied
in a vacuum.
Where some countervailing
principle is to be served, the doctrine must
occasionally yield. See, e.g., UWC Assoc, v.
Home Sav. & Loan, 78 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 8
(1988).
754 P.2d at 674
In Cox, appellants raised for the first time on appeal
the inapplicability of the Utah Procurement Code, Section 63-56-1
to -73, and its payment bond requirements, Section 14-1-13, Utah
Code Ann.

Judge Orme compared the circumstances in Cox to the

case of Robbins v. Sonoma County Flood Control & Water Cons.
District, 138 Cal. 291, 292 P.2d 52, 56 (Cal. App. 1956):
. . . [A] pleading must be tested, not
by what it says as to the effect of [public
laws and public acts], but by the contents of
the laws and acts themselves."
754 P.2d at 675.
See also Maynard Investment Co. v. McCann, 465 P.2d 657, 660-661

11

(Wash. 1970); and Huntress v. Huntress1 Estate, 235 F.2d 205, 209
(7th Cir. 1956).
In Cox, Judge Orme examined

the contents of the

statutes themselves, held that they were not applicable and
reversed the decision of the trial court.

The case was remanded

for a determination of whether additional evidence should be
received.
In James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah App. 1987)
Judge Garff articulated principles for determining when and under
what circumstances a new issue might be considered:
. . . In Utah, matters not raised in the
pleadings nor put in issue at the trial may
not be raised for the first time on appeal.
Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P. 2d 754,
758 (Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire
Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983). A
matter is sufficiently raised if it has been
submitted to the trial court and the trial
court has had the opportunity to make
findings of fact or law.
See Turtle
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc. ,
645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982). "Theories or
issues which are not apparent or reasonably
discernible from the pleadings, affidavits
and exhibits will not be considered."
Minnehoma Fin. Co. v. Pauli, 565 P.2d 835,
838 (Wyo. 1977).
In particular, even if
pleadings are generously interpreted, if they
are not supported by any factual showing or
by the submission of legal authority, they
are not presented for decision.
Intf 1
Business Mach. Corp. v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho
194, 677 P. 2d 507, 510 (1964). Further, the
rule that a legal theory may not be raised
for the first time on appeal is "to be
12

s t r i n g e n t l y applied when the new theory
depends on controverted factual questions
whose relevance thereto was not made to
a p p e a r at t r i a l . "
Boqacki v. Bd. of
Supervisors, 5 Cal. 3d 771, 489 P.2d 537,
543-44, 97 Cal. Rptr. 657, 663-64 (1971),
cert, denied, 405 U.S. 1030, 92 S.Ct. 1301,
31 L.Ed.2d 488 (1972); see also Campbell v.
Graham-Armstrong, 9 Cal.3d 482, 509 P.2d 689,
107 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1973); Church v. Roemer,
94 Idaho 782, 498 P.2d 1255, 1258-59 (1972).
In order for a theory to be considered on appeal, then,
certain requirements must be met:
1.

The matter must have been either raised in the

pleadings or put in issue at trial.
2.

If a matter is put at issue and submitted to the

trial court, the trial court must have had an opportunity to make
findings of fact or law.
3.

The theory or issue must be apparent or reasonably

discernible from the pleadings.
4.

A matter raised in a pleading must be supported

either by a factual showing or the submission of legal authority.
5.

The theory or issue must not depend on facts that

could have been controverted before the trial court.
Here
In this case, the matter of the Lis Pendens having been
recorded on April 11, 1983 was raised in Paragraph 4 of Weber's
June 3, 1988 Statement of Points and Authorities in Opposition to
13

Defendant
Judgment.

Snyderville

West's Motion to Set Aside Default

(R. 0664-0682, % 4)
The fact that the Lis Pendens had been recorded was a

basic given before the trial court.

Whether it had been recorded

was never at issue.
The doctrine of lis pendens is readily discernible from
the undisputed fact that the Lis Pendens was recorded.

The Lis

Pendens was recorded pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-402.

The contents of that statute expressly set forth the doctrine

of lis pendens.
In its June

24, 1988 trial

court Memorandum

in

Response, Snyderville did not dispute the fact that the Lis
Pendens had been recorded.

(R. 0731-0825)

In fact, on March 20,

1990 Snyderville acknowledged before the Court of Appeals that
the April 11, 1983 Lis Pendens was "a document incontrovertibly
of record in the Summit County Recorder's Office."

(Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant/Respondent
Snyderville West's Motion to Disregard or Strike Reply Brief of
Plaintiff/Appellant, p. 4 —

Appendix M C W hereto)

Snyderville1s

failure to dispute Weber's assertion that the Lis Pendens had
been recorded amounted to a factual showing by Weber of the truth
of that assertion.

Utah law does not require that the recorded

Lis Pendens be filed in the action of which it gives notice.
14

Snyderville could not hstve controverted the fact of the
Lis

Pendens

having

been

recorded.

The

document

was

uncontrovertibly of record in the Summit County Recorder's
Office.
Weber's Reply Brief presented a purely legal issue to
the Court of Appeals:
governed the action.

Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953),
Where a purely legal issue is raised in a

case for the first time before an appellate court, that case
should be governed by the applicable law.

See, e.g. , Vintero

Corp. v. Corporacion Venezolana de Fomento, 675 F.2d 513, 515 (2d
Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (five cases from various circuits cited
as authority

for appellate consideration of new issues if

additional facts not required, or pure legal issue involved;
unjust

enrichment

issue considered when only argument for

imposition of constructive trust raised below); Ricard v. Birch,
529 F.2d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 1975) (application of tolling statute
could be raised for first time on appeal as exception to rule of
nonreviewability) ; Burns v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 265
Cal. App. 2d 98, 105-06, 71 Cal. Rptr. 326, 330 (1968) (court
cited three prior decisions as precedent for permitting new
issues of law to be raised first on appeal); Cronin v. Lindberg,
66 111. 2d 47, 61, 360 N.E.2d 360, 366 (1976) (citing two prior
decisions that allowed exceptions based on public importance of
15

legal issues to be raised on appeal); People ex rel. Sterba v.
Blaser, 33 111. App. 3d 1, 10-11, 337 N.E.2d 410, 416 (1975)
(court referred to one prior holding to support new legal issue
being raised when all pertinent facts were before the court);
Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1969) (in
interest of judicial economy, applicability of Voting Rights Act
provision not precluded from consideration by failure to raise
issue below where all facts undisputed); Telco Leasing, Inc. v.
Transwestern Title Co., 630 F.2d 691, 693-94 (9th Cir. 1980)
(where issue purely one of law and not affected by factual record
below appellate court has discretion to consider for first time
application of correct state statute concerning attorney's fees);
Zinn v. Ex-Cell-0 Corp., 148 Cal. App. 2d 56, 82-83, 306 P.2d
1017, 1034 (1957) (court permitted application of conflict of
laws doctrine for first time on appeal); Hiqqinbotham v. Ford
Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1976).
raises a purely

legal question.

"[T]he new theory

No facts could have been

developed to aid our resolution of the issue. . . .

Under these

circumstances, we believe it would be unjust now to refuse to
consider the new argument."
of California stated:

Id. at 768 n.10.

The Supreme Court

lf

[W]hen as here the facts with reference

to the contention newly made on appeal appear to be undisputed
and that probably no different showing could be made on a new
16

trial it is deemed appropriate to entertain the contention as a
question

of

law on the undisputed

accordingly,"

facts and pass on it

Panopulos v. Maderls, 47 Cal. 2d 337, 341, 302

P. 2d 738, 740 (1956); Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 24 Cal- App. 3d 35, 43, 100 Cal. Rptr. 791, 797
(1972) (court permitted new argument based on provision of
California Labor Act when all pertinent facts were before the
court), afffd, 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
This is such a case.

The integrity of the judicial

process in an in rem proceeding should not be subverted by
allowing an interloper who is a party to that proceeding to put
property beyond the trial court's jurisdiction by means of a
spurious deed to a general partnership whose managing partner has
both actual and constructive notice that the property is before
the court for disposition.
This Court should issue a Writ of Certiorari to the
Utah Court

of Appeals

to review and reverse that court's

erroneous decision not to consider Weber's lis pendens argument.
POINT II.
BY VIRTUE OF THE DOCTRINE OF L I S
PENDENS SET FORTH IN SECTION 7 8 - 4 0 2,
UTAH
CODE A N N .
(1953),
S N Y D E R V I L L E WAS BOUND BY THE
STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT AND THE
JANUARY 1 7 , 1 9 8 6 JUDGMENT VESTING
TITLE TO THE SEVEN ACRES IN WEBER.

17

The argument supporting this point is set forth in
Point I of the Reply Brief of Appellant, which is included as
Appendix "D" to this Petition.
CONCLUSION
The

applicability of Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann.

(1953) and the doctrine of lis pendens contained therein is a
purely legal issue which should have been considered by the panel
of the Court of Appeals.

Snyderville could not have disputed the

fact of the Lis Pendens having been recorded on April 11, 1983.
The Court of Appeals ordered that Weber's Motion to Supplement
the Record to include the Lis Pendens be granted.
This Court should grant Weber's Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to preserve the integrity of the judicial process in
quiet title proceedings.
DATED:

November 19, 1990.
Respectfully submitted

ROBERT/J. 0RT0N ^ ~ ^ — ^
VIRGINIA C. LEE
MARSDEN, 0RT0N, CAH00N & QOTTFREDSQN
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Hand delivered

four

(4) copies of this Petition of

Plaintiff/Appellant for Writ of Certiorari to:
18

jfP

Richard A, Rappapoct, Esq,
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorneys for Appellee
Fifth Floor
525 East First South
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

this >9th day of November, 1990.

Pursuant to Rules 45 through 49

of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, each of those four (4)
copies indicated on its cover the date of filing of the Petition
and the Certiorari Docketing Number of the Utah Supreme Court.
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APPENDIX
Order and Motion to Supplement Record
Opinion of the Panel of the Utah Court of Appeals; 146 Utah
Adv. Rep. 40.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Defendant/Respondent Snyderville West's Motion to Disregard
or Strike Reply Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant
Reply Brief of Appellant (Addendum "F" omitted)
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
Brenda Major Webb,
Personal Representative of
the Estate of Robert W. Major,
Sr,. Deceased,

ORDER

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 890599-CA

English Inn Co., Inc., a
Utah corporation, et al.,
Defendants,
and
Snyderville West,
Defendant and Respondent.

This matter is before the court on appellant's motion to
supplement the record and respondent's motion to strike
portions of appellant's reply brief. Respondent has filed an
objection to the motion to supplement the record.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the motion to supplement the
record is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the motion to strike portions
of appellant's reply brief is deferred until plenary
presentatiorLjand consideration of the case.

<
4v-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of March, 1990, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United
States mail.
Robert F. Orton
Virgina Curtis Lee
Marsden, orton & Cahoon
Attorneys at Law
68 South Main, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Richard A. Rappaport
William B. Wray, Jr.,
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
525 East First South
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
DATED this 16th day of March, 1990.

1

ROBERT F. ORTON - //A2 4 83
VIRGINIA C. LEE - #19 2 3
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON
68 SOUTH MAIN STREET, FIFTH FV.OOK
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 34 101
TELEPHONE:
(801) f>2 I - 3HOO

2
3

COURT OF APPEALS

4

.STATE OF UTAH

5
6
7

BRENDA MAJOR WEBEU,
Personal Representative of
the Estate of ROBERT to.
MAJOR, SR., Deceased,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

8
9
10

Case No. 8905'99-CA
District Court
No. 7325

vs.
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a
Utah corporation, et a.l . ,

11

Priority:

14(b)

Defendants,

12
and

MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD

13
SNYDERVILLE WEST,

14
Defendant/Respondent.

15
Pursuant

16

to Rule 11 of the Rules of the Utah Court of

P.l a 1 n t i f f ' Appe.l 1 ant

17

Appeals,

18

Representative of the Estate of Robert W. Major, Jr., Deceased,

19

by and

20

Supplementing

21

recorded

22

Motion is brought for the following reasons:

23
24

through

Brenda

Major

Weber,

counsel , hereby moves this Court
the Record

with respect

on Appeal

to include

t>> this action on April

Personal

for an Order

the Lis Pendens
11, 1983.

This

1.
Opposition
1

II Default

In

hur

to Defendant

Statement

2

Statement

3

Pendens

was

4

County,

State of Utah with

5

0682,

8

in

set

in

to Set Aside
forth

in the

11th day of April, 1983, a Lis

the office of the Recorder
respect

of

to said action.

Summit

(R. 0664-

14)

6

2o

7

and Authorities

Representative

thai: on the

recorded

Points

Snyderville West's Motion

Judgment, the Pergonal
of Facts

of

In

its Memorandum

did not dispute this fact.
I

3.

In

her

in Response, Snyderville

West

(R. 0731-0825)

Brief

of

Appellant,

the

Personal

9

Representative again stcrU-t; the fact that on April 11, 1983, the

10

Personal Representative caused a Lis Pendens regarding the quiet

11

title

12

Office.

action

recorded

4.

5.

17

county in which the property

21
22
23
24

County

S o d .inn 7H-40-2, Utah Code Ann.

for

20

Summit

Recorder's

In its Brief of Respondent, Snyderville West does

16

19

the

not dispute this fact.

15

18

in

(Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 18)

13
14

to be

filing

a

lis

pendens

for record with

(1953) provides

the recorder

of the

is situated, but does not require a

copy of the lis pendens to be filed with the court in which the
action is pending..
6.

The: Lis

Pendens

recorded

with respect

to this

action

was

styled

as a pleading

in the action and a copy is

attached as Exhibit "A" hereto.
1

II

7.

Appellant be.11 ewes that the Lis Pendens would be

2

helpful to this Court in definitively establishing the undisputed

3

fact

4

acres.

5

it was

recorded

8.

In her

and

that

it concerned

Kep.ly Brief
the

Appellant, the Personal

Representative

7

Snyderville

8

action affecting its equitable title to the seven acres, and that

9

together with the actual notice Snyderville West had through its

10

managing partner, James R. Gaddis, Snyderville West is bound by

11

the results set forth in the January 17, 1986 Judgment

West

that

seven

6

12 I DATED:

argues

of

the subject

recorded

Lis

Pendens

gave

r;orit>i rvrntivi,' notice of the pendency of this

February 2G, 1990.

13

" .I.

'i-lAeiiM^luu.

y

ROBERTAS. ORTOI
VlKGINIiDc. LEE
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & GOTTFREDSON
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16 "
17 ||

18
19
20
21
22
23
24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Mailed

a

true

and

correct

copy

Supplement Record to:
Richard A. Rappaport
William B. Wray, Jr.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
Fifth Floor
3

of

this

Motion

to

525 East. F i r s t
P . O . Box 1 ]O0ii

South

Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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1

ROBERT F . ORTON
T . RICHARD DAVIS

2

MARSDEN. ORTON & LILJENOUIST

3

ATTORNEYS FOR

4

PLAINTIFF

6 8 SOUTH MAIN. FIFTH FLOOR

5

SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101

6

T E L E P H O N E : (801) 5 2 1 - 3 8 0 0

Entry No
Book

204486

M<P^7

Pago

**C'<\

HEOUEST Or lf?Jij^j(-~J»- O ^ f c ^

7
8
9
10
11

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STEVEN W. MAJOR, Personal
Representative of the Estate of
ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR., Deceased,

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Plaintiff,

LIS PENDENS

vs.
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a Utah
Corporation; PARK CITY UTAH
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation,
CHARLES E. HIRSCH; HAROLD D.
HIRSCH; SAM A. HEPNER, EUGENE H.
POWERT; MASASHI HASHIDA; J. E.
ROBERTS a/k/a JACK E. ROBERTS,
FROSTWOOD LIMITED, a Utah
Limited Partnership; J. L.
KROFCHECK a/k/a JOSEPH L.
KROFCHECK; ROBERT L. BARRETT;
SNYDERVILLE WEST; PARTNERSHIP
INVESTMENT OF COLORADO, INC., a
Corporation; PARK WEST WATER
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non-Profit
Corporation; HALBET ENGINEERING,
INC., a California Corporation;
HALBET PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
Corporation; MAJOR-BLAKENEY
CORPORATION, a California

C i v i l No.

7336

BQOKM 2 5 7 PAGE23 6

Y7

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Corporation; ASPEN GROVE, INC., a
Utah Corporation; LESTER F.
HEWLETT, JR.; RUTH BRAZIER HEWLETT;
SNYDERVILLE LAND CO., a Utah
Limited Partnership; H. E. BABCOCK
and J. E. ROBERTS d/b/a PARKWEST
LAND COMPANY, INVESTOR ASSOCIATES,
SYNDICATE, a Delaware Unincorporated Association; WILLIAM S.
RICHARDS; MURRAY FIRST THRIFT AND
LOAN COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
J- ROBERT WEST; LIFE RESOURCES,
INC., an Oregon Corporation; KARL
C. LESUEUR; H. J. SAPERSTEIN,
TRUSTEE; PEOPLES FINANCE & THRIFT
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a Utah
Corporation; WAYLAND P. CALKINS;
BARBARA CALKINS; McGHIE LAND TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
Trustee, AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES
OF UTAH, INC., a Utah Corporation;
JOHN CANEPARI; KERRY D. BODILY;
SKI PARK CITY WEST, INC., a Utah
Corporation; NATIONAL PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation; ENSIGN COMPANY, a California
Limited Partnership; ROBERT W.
ENSIGN? CITY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, a Corporation;
WESTERN STATES TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; J. TAYLOR LOTT
a/k/a JOHN TAYLOR LOTT; UTAH TITLE
& ABSTRACT COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation; PARK WEST ASSOCIATES,
a Utah General Partnership; JAMES
WEBSTER ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah
Corporation; JAY BAKER d/b/a JAY
BAKER ELECTRIC; RYDER STILLWELL;
DIANA L. LESUEUR; A. J. SLAGEL
a/k/a ZELLA J. SLAGEL; RAY WINN;
JOHN MULLER; GERALD W. WALTERS;
NEW YORK INVESTORS, INC., d New
York Corporation; MICHAEL SPURLOCK;
DORIE SPURLOCK; MARIA KROFCHECK;
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 24, Inclusive;
and all other persons unknown
claiming any right, title, or

B00KM2 57PAGE23 7
-

2 -

I.
li
i

I
II

II
|| interest in or lien against the real
property described in Plaintiff's
Complaint adverse to Plaintiff's
ownership or clouding his title
I thereto; PARK CITY WEST ASSOCIATION,
j a Utah Corporation; CITY DEVELOPMENT
CO., INC., a Utah Corporation;
STANDARD INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a
California Corporation; GREAT
NORTHERN LAND CORPORATION, a
I California Corporation; INN
I INVESTORS, a Partnership; TITLE
I INSURANCE AGENCY, a Utah Corporation;
j REESE HOWELL; AMERICAN SAVINGS &
j LOAN, a Utah Corporation; JOE COX;
JIM GADDIS; SAM WILSON; HENRY
WINKLER; and JOHN DOES 2 5 through
50, Inclusive,
U
Defendants.

TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Notice is hereby given that an action has been commenced
in the above-entitled Court, by the above-named Plaintiff against
the above-named Defendants, which suit is now pending; that one of
the objects of said suit is to quiet title in the Estate of Robert
W. Major, Jr., Deceased, to real property situated in Summit
County, State of Utah, specifically described in Exhibit "A" which
is attached hereto.
DATED THIS 5J£.

day of April, 1983.

ROBERT F. ORTON
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
Attorneys for Plaintiff

B00KM2 57PAGE23 8

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

1
2
3

On this S^fo?

day of April, 1983, personally appeared

4
before me ROBERT F. ORTON, signer of the foregoing Instrument,
5
who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
6
7
8

.4

E 4'/''%

^fi^COM&ESSION
fio

NOTARY PUBLIC
PUBLIC

\

£'"*.

1

•• ^

Residing at:

(/0

>

Z

BMUtt/\0LA^

~ 1 _ * _

nu^ETj

EXPIRES:

J

*i3«.' « > - * :
•14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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EXHIBIT "A"

Parcel No, 1:
Lot A, Lots 18 thru 19, 22 thru 24, 28 thru 38, PARK CITY WEST SUBDIVISION
NO. 1, according to the official plat thereof on file and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder, State of Utah.
Parcel No. 2;
Lots 1 thru A,, 17 thru 25, PARK CITY VEST SUBDIVISION NO. 2, according to the
official plat thereof on file and of record in the office of the Summit County
Recorder, State of Utah. Also, THE MALL, PARK CITY WEST SUBDIVISION NO. 2.
Parcel No. 3:
In Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian:
Beginning at a point which is the NW corner of property conveyed to Spencer
Osborne et ux., in a Special Warranty Deed recorded March 31, 1969, as Entry
No. 108801, in Book M-20, page 389, O.R., said point being on the North line of
said Section 1; thence West along said section line 432 feet; thence South 1°
50* East 715 feet; thence East 410 feet, more or less, to a point which is
directly South of the aforesaid beginning point; thence North in a straight
line to the said point of beginning 713 feet, more or less. TOGETHER,WITH
an Easement for ingress, egress and underground utilities as set forth in the
.first paragraph on page 5 of that certain Judgment on Stipulation recorded as
Entry No. 113601, Book M-32, pages 269-276, on July 26, 1971.
Parcel No. 4;
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian:
The North 165 feet of the SW 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SW 1/4 o£ Section 36;
and the South 1/2 of the NW 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SW 1/4 of Section 36;
and the West 100 feet of the N 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4
of Section 36; and the North 330 feet of the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SW
1/4 of Section 36. TOGETHER WITH an Easement for ingress, egress and underground utilities as set forth in the second paragraph on page 5 of that certain Judgment on Stipulation recorded as Entry No. 113601, Book M-32, pages
269-276, on July 26, 1971.
Parcel No. 5t
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian:
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 25, Park City West Plat No. 2; thence
North along the East line of said Plat No. 2 for 204 feet; thence East 160
fret; thence South 204.00 feet; thence in a straight line West to the point of
beginning. TOGETHER WITH an Easement 27.6 feet wide for ingress, egress and
underground utilities, over a land strip lying 13.8 feet each side of a ccnt.erline commencing at a point which is 173.8 feet East of the Southeast corner of
Lot 25, Park City West Plat No. 2; thence 680.6 feet North, more or Jess, to
a right of way south line, which right of way is known as "Major Drive" within
said Park City West Plat No. 2, connecting with Park City t/est Plat No. 1, said
plats being recorded subdivision in the Summit County records.
Parcel No. 6:
Part of the Southwest quarter of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East,
part of the iNorthwest quarter Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 4 East, and
part of Northeast quarter of Section 1, Township 2 SouLh, Range 3 East ot rhe
Salt Lake Base and Meridian described as follows: Beginning at the Southwest
corner of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Summit County, Utah, and running thence North along Section line 502.3
feet: thence East 850.00 feet; thence SOULII 138.00 feet; thence West 482.80

Porc.cl No. 7:
•

Parcel No- 8*
•

f

,

„

r haif

n

.-,,-t-or o/ Section 36, Township 1 South,

of the Southwest quarter of the Southeast q u a r t e r

s%rr»: &strr£2. LS r«.. ^ — «. - *.«.-.
Parcel Ko. 9:

T*
/ r«-r ciir Lake Base and Meridian,
X. Section 31. Township 1 South g n j . * - . J ^ U ^
^
^
.,
Becinnins at a point on the v.est iin
Southwest corner of said
feet Sorth and 1,412-0 feet. •• « " J ^ U
fc«
i
of Hi 6 hway 248 for 383.5

ssrit ssr^T^-*«7»o—s ^ - 5 u«. —or lM..
to the point of beginning hereof.

Parcel No. 10 s
„ i j,-_„ Parrel Number 1 and Parcel Number 2 ,
The right of way - f - s ^ ; ^ l
Deed recorded a s Entry No.
n ^ n t y
contained and described i n £ a C « ^ £ o n D e c e L r 1 9 . 1968 fl 9:25 A.H., O.K.
108283, i n Boole M-19, at Pages xu x ^ »
Parcel Ho> 1 1 :
^^
A l l of the r e a l property, together
of way. ass contained
escrxd
contained an
and d
aescro-ucu

«<rh a nerDetual 76 foot easement and r i g h t
J ^
W j u
^
^
^
as
1*»t h-.-a t c—
^ ^
^
f ^

Entry No, 106902, in Book M15, at Page 619, on April 8, 1968,
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OPINION
(For Publication)

Brenda Major Weber,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 890599-CA
v.
Snyderville West, et al.,

F I L E D
October 19, 1990

Defendants and Appellee,

Third District, Summit County
The Honorable Michael R. Murphy
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Attorneys:

Robert F. Orton and Virginia Curtis Lee, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant
Richard A. Rappaport and William B. Wray, Jr.
Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
This is an appeal by plaintiff Brenda Major Weber1
challenging interlocutory and final orders setting aside a
default judgment in favor of plaintiff and dismissing defendant
Snvrlorvi l ^
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Woci-

("^nvHorvi
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quiet title to real property. This appeal primarily focuses on
the sufficiency of service of process on Snyderville.
FACTS
On April 6, 1983, Steven W. Major filed a complaint to
quiet title to eleven parcels of real estate located in Summit
1. This action was originally brought by Steven W. Major,
personal representative of the estate of Robert W. Major, Jr<
During the course of the litigation Steven W. Major died and
the present plaintiff was named as successor personal
representative.

County. Snyderville, a Utah general partnership, and Jim
Gaddis were two of seventy named defendants*2 Jim Gaddis
holds a ten-percent interest in Snyderville and is its managing
partner.
In 1978, Snyderville purchased from Investor Associates a
portion of the property at issue in the quiet title action.
Robert W. Major executed the pertinent real estate contract on
behalf of Investor Associates. Snyderville took possession of
the property and made timely payments, with the final payment
being made on July 20, 1983. In October 1983, Snyderville
recorded a warranty deed for the property given to it by
Investor Associates. Snyderville paid property taxes on the
parcel through October 1987, when it learned that the trial
court had divested it of title by means of a default judgment
against it.
From the time it took possession of the subject property
in 1978, Snyderville's address had been correctly listed as
Gaddis*s office address on the Summit County tax records.
No filing in the appropriate county or state offices
revealed the name of any individual affiliated with Snyderville
nor did Snyderville have a telephone directory listing.
Although Gaddis was served in his individual capacity at his
office on May 11, 1983, the summons served upon him was
directed to him individually and made no reference to
Snyderville except in the lengthy caption listing all seventy
defendants. The return of service indicated that Gaddis had
been served personally and did not purport that service on
Snyderville had been effected through him. By order dated
December 17, 1983, the trial court allowed service by
publication upon Snyderville and sixteen other named defendants.
As a corollary to service by publication, counsel for
Weber prepared a summons for mailing to Snyderville at its tax
address, i.e*, Gaddis's office at 1253 East 2100 South in Salt
Lake City.
2. As may be expected in litigation involving numerous parties
and several transactions, the facts before the court are
numerous and complicated. We commend counsel for both parties
for their succinct presentation of the relevant facts. We
further note that both parties' careful compliance with Utah R.
App. P. 24 has assisted the court in efficiently deciding the
matters before it. Of particular assistance to the court was
the comprehensive addenda of key documents annexed to the
briefs.

The affidavit of mailing listed Snyderville's address as
"1253 East 7100 South," incorrectly stating the south
coordinate by fifty blocks. Although there is no such address,
and, according to a Postal Service supervisor's affidavit, the
summons directed to Snyderville should have been returned by
the Postal Service, counsel for Weber did not recall that the
summons had been returned, although other summonses were
returned for insufficient postage. The Postal Service does not
keep records of returned first class mail and it is therefore
unknown if the mailed summons ever reached Snyderville, Gaddis
had no recollection of receiving a summons through the mail.
The trial court entered a default judgment against
Snyderville on August 29, 1985. In the fall of 1988,
Snyderville sought to have the judgment set aside. The
district court determined that there was "no adequate
explanation . . . [for the] failure to personally serve
Snyderville West at its known tax address" and set aside the
judgment. In 1989, Snyderville filed a Motion to Dismiss
premised on Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), which was
granted. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Weber claims that Snyderville was effectively
served through personal service upon Jim Gaddis or,
alternatively, that it was properly served by publication.
Weber also challenges the court's order of dismissal in favor
of Snyderville as improper under Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 3
PERSONAL SERVICE
Weber asserts that Gaddis's position as managing partner
of Snyderville qualified him to receive service of process for
Snyderville. Weber further claims that service upon Gaddis
automatically perfected service upon Snyderville by virtue of
his position as managing partner and his status as a partner.
We agree that Gaddis was authorized to receive process for
Snyderville. See Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(5) (service upon a
3. Weber also claims that, notwithstanding any deficiencies in
service of process, Snyderville is bound by a stipulation for
settlement and the judgment entered thereon on January 17,
1986, by reason of the fact Gaddis, through his own counsel,
was a party to the stipulation. We find no merit in this
argument nor in Weber's lis pendens argument, raised for the
first time in her reply brief.

partnership shall be effective through service upon managing or
general agent). However, personal service upon Gaddis did not
confer jurisdiction over Snyderville* Weber incorrectly
focuses on Gaddis's capacity, rather than the import of the
summons served upon him* Any number of agents or partners of
Snyderville might be authorized to receive service for the
partnership, yet if no service is ever attempted on the
partnership no service on it can be perfected.4
Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states,
with our emphasis: "The summons shall contain the . . . names
. . . of the parties to the action . . . [and] be directed to
the defendant." Gaddis1s summons was directed to him, not to
Snyderville. While this might have provided Snyderville with
constructive or even actual knowledge of the action, the
insufficiency of process is not thereby cured. See Stone v.
Hicks, 45 N.C. App, 66, 262 S.E.2d 318, 319 (1980) (where one
defendant received a summons directed to another defendant,
service was ineffective on the receiving defendant even though
the caption listed him as a defendant). See generally 62B Am.
Jur. 2d Process section 81 (1990). We hold that service of
process upon Jim Gaddis in his individual capacity did not
effect service of process upon, nor confer jurisdiction over,
Snyderville.
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION
Rule 4(f)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in
effect at all times pertinent to this case,5 authorized
service by publication when personal service is impractical
because the
person upon whom service is sought resides
outside of the state, or has departed from
the state, or cannot after due diligence
be found within the state . . . .

4o Weber's claim that service on Gaddis was adequate to serve
the partnership is belied by Weber's own course of conduct. If
she believed Snyderville had been properly served through
Gaddis there would have been no need to include it in the
motion seeking leave to serve by publication, in the order
authorizing publication or in the published summons, nor to
undertake efforts to mail the published summons to Snyderville.
5.

The comparable rule now appears at Utah R. Civ. P. 4(g).

The party desiring service of process
by publication shall file a motion
verified by the oath of such party or
someone in his behalf for an order of
publication. It shall state the facts
authorizing such service and shall show
the efforts that have been made to obtain
personal service within this state . . . .
The court shall hear the motion ex parte
and, if satisfied that due diligence has
been used to obtain personal service
within this state, or that efforts to
obtain the same would have been of no
avail, shall order publication of the
summons in a newspaper having general
circulation in the county in which the
action is pending.
Rule 4 requires the exercise of "due diligence" to locate
the defendant before the court may authorize service by
publication. "Due diligence must be tailored to fit the
circumstances of each case. It is that diligence which is
appropriate to accomplish the end sought and which is
reasonably calculated to do so." Parker v. Ross, 117 Utah 417,
217 P.2d 373, 379 (1950). ££fi also Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d
1269, 1277 n.13 (Utah 1987).
Counsel for Weber was faced with the task of sorting
through numerous disorganized files containing Robert Major's
personal and business affairs. Many documents were held by
family members and former counsel. At the time of trial,
counsel could not recall whether he had seen any documents
specifically linking Snyderville and Gaddis or any contracts or
deeds concerning the conveyance to Snyderville among the
records he examined.
Snyderville first came to plaintiffs counsel's attention
in a June 1982 title report showing Snyderville1s interest.
In an effort to locate information he considered
necessary to serve Snyderville, counsel searched in telephone
directories, motor vehicle files, corporate filings in Utah and
California, the County Recorder's files in Summit and Salt Lake
counties, and in postal records. It is apparent, however, that
Snyderville's address was set forth in the Summit county tax
records pertaining to the very property in issue. Counsel's
quest was apparently for the name of a particular individual

tied to Snyderville through whom service upon Snyderville could
be perfected. Oddly, however, no inquiry was made by counsel
at the address disclosed as Snyderville's address in the tax
records, of which counsel had knowledge no later than October
1983, nor was any service of process attempted on Snyderville
at this address.° Had either been done, Weber would readily
have been able to personally serve Snyderville through Gaddis,
whose office was the very address stated in the tax records,
A plaintiff seeking authorization for service by
publication on a defendant for whom an in-state address is
known must, at a minimum, make inquiry at that address. Cf.
Downev State Bank v. Maior-Blakeney Corp., 545 P.2d 507, 509
(Utah 1976) (plaintiff need not exhaust all possibilities where
there is an effort to serve defendant at the only address
reasonably known). This requirement is not only a prerequisite
for satisfying the due diligence prong of Rule 4, but will also
go a long way in establishing a proper factual record upon
which the court may base its order for service by publication.
Service by publication is inappropriate where no personal
inquiry is made at a last known address within the state.7

6. Apparently counsel thought that unless he could advise the
constable of the name and title of a particular person through
whom Snyderville could be served, he could not appropriately
seek service of Snyderville at the address of which he was
aware. A personal visit to the address would presumably have
elicited such information. But such information is not
necessarily required. Had counsel simply advised the constable
to serve Snyderville at its known address, by and through any
••managing or general agent, or other agent authorized to
receive service of process . . . .,* Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(5),
one of two things would have happened, either of which would
have served counsel's purposes. The return would have come
back indicating service was effected on Snyderville by and
through its managing partner, Jim Gaddis, in which event
personal service would be complete, or the return would have
come back with an "unable to serve" notation, with explanation
of the constable's failure to locate at the address any person
having knowledge of Snyderville despite diligent inquiry, in
which event the entitlement to serve by publication would be
ironclad given the extensive other efforts exerted by counsel.
7. We note that any defendant served by publication has
standing to challenge the sufficiency of service of process,
Carlson, 740 P.2d at 1271, even where authorized by an order
which, as here, is not directly attacked.

Since service by publication on Snyderville was not warranted,
such service was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction over
Snyderville. See Hustace v. Kapuni, 6 Haw. App. 241, 718 P.2d
1109, 1116 (1986) (where service by publication is
insufficient, subsequent default judgment is void ab initio).
DISMISSAL
The thrust of Weber's challenge of the ultimate dismissal
of the complaint as against Snyderville is that the court
failed to "issue a brief written statement of the ground for
its decision," as is required on all motions granted under
Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56 and 59 when the motion is based
on more than one ground." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Weber points
out that Snyderville advanced arguments for dismissal under
both Rule 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) and therefore Rule 52(a) is
applicable. We agree, noting however that Weber did not raise
this issue below.
In Alford v. Utah League of Cities and Towns, 791 P.2d
201, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), we held that failure to protest
the trial court's apparent noncompliance with Rule 52 at the
trial level precludes consideration of the omission on
appeal.8 Weber should have raised the issue with the trial
8. Without minimizing the importance of the written statement
required by Rule 52(a), which acquaints both the parties and
any reviewing court of the trial court's rationale, we note
that even if the plaintiff had raised the issue of a written
statement of grounds before the trial court and the court had
not filed its written statement as required by Rule 52(a), we
would likely conclude that the omission was harmless error.
Cf. Burnett v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3
(1990) (where trial court did not identify reason for
dismissal, Supreme Court assumed dismissal was premised on one
or both of the grounds advanced in motion to dismiss and
affirmed after considering only one of those grounds, and
determining it was well-taken); Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770
P.2d 163, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (where trial court did not
state basis for judgment, appellate court considered grounds
advanced in motion for summary judgment and affirmed upon
concluding judgment was properly premised on one of such
grounds); Dover Elev. Co. v. Hill Manoum Investment. 766 P.2d
424, 426 n.4 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (where trial court did not
state basis for judgment on stipulated facts, appellate court
noted similarity to cross-motions for summary judgment and
merely noted that "a 'brief written statement of the ground'
for the court's disposition would have been appropriate").

court, thereby giving the court the opportunity to cure the
problem.
We may affirm the trial court on any proper ground.
Rnehner Block Co, v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah
1988)- Thus, if dismissal in this case can be sustained either
on Rule 12(b)(5) or 12(b)(6) grounds, we will affirm. £f.
Burnett v. Utah Power & Light C o . . 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990)
(where trial court did not identify reason for dismissal,
Supreme Court assumed dismissal was premised on one or both of
the grounds advanced in motion to dismiss and affirmed after
considering only one of those grounds, and determining it was
well-taken).
Weber has limited her argument on dismissal insofar as
premised on Rule 12(b)(5) to an incorporation by reference of
her arguments that Snyderville was sufficiently served either
through personal service on Gaddis or by publication. We have
treated these arguments above and found both to be without
merit. Given the limited scope of Weber's 12(b)(5) argument,
it follows that the order of dismissal should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Because Snyderville West was not properly served either
personally or by publication, the default judgment entered
against it was properly set aside. Because Weber has raised no
argument demonstrating error in dismissal on Rule 12(b)(5)
grounds, the order of dismissal will not be disturbed.
Affirmed.
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OPINION
ORME, Judge:
This is an appeal by plaintiff Brenda Major
Weber 1 challenging interlocutory and final
orders setting aside a default judgment in
favor of plaintiff and dismissing defendant
Snyderville West ("Snyderville") as a party to
an action to quiet title to real property. This
appeal primarily focuses on the sufficiency of
service of process on Snyderville.
FACTS
On April 6, 1983, Steven W. Major filed a
complaint to quiet title to eleven parcels of
real estate located in Summit County. Snyderville, a Utah general partnership, and Jim
Gaddis were two of seventy named defendants. 2 Jim Gaddis holds a ten-percent interest
in Snyderville and is its managing partner.
In 1978, Snyderville purchased from Investor Associates a portion of the property at
issue in the quiet title action. Robert W.
Major executed the pertinent real estate contract on behalf of Investor Associates. Snyderville took possession of the property and
made timely payments, with the final payment
being made on July 20, 1983. In October
1983, Snyderville recorded a warranty deed for
the property given to it by Investor Associates.
Snyderville paid property taxes on the parcel
through October 1987, when it learned that
the trial court had divested it of title by means
of a default judgment against it.
From the time it took possession of the

No filing in the appropriate county or state
offices revealed the name of any individual
affiliated with Snyderville nor did Snyderville
have a telephone directory listing. Although
Gaddis was served in his individual capacity at
his office on May I I , 1983. the summons
served upon him was directed to him individually and made no reference to Snyderville
except in the lengthy caption listing all seventy
defendants. The return of service indicated
that Gaddis had been served personally and
did not purport that service on Snyderville had
been effected through him. By order dated
December 17, 1983, the trial court allowed
service by publication upon Snyderville and
sixteen other named defendants.
As a corollary to service by publication,
counsel for Weber prepared a summons for
mailing to Snyderville at its tax address, i.e.,
Gaddis's office at 1253 East 2100 South in
Salt Lake City.
The affidavit of mailing listed Snyderville's
address as "1253 East 7100 South," incorrectly
stating the south coordinate by fifty blocks.
Although there is no such address, and, according to a Postal Service supervisor's affidavit, the summons directed to Snyderville
should have been returned by the Postal
Service, counsel for Weber did not recall that
the summons had been returned, although
other summonses were returned for insufficient postage. The Postal Service does not keep
records of returned first class mail and it is
therefore unknown if the mailed summons
ever reached Snyderville. Gaddis had no recollection of receiving a summons through the
mail.
The trial court entered a default judgment
against Snyderville on August 29, 1985. In the
fall of 1988, Snyderville sought to have the
judgment set aside. The district court determined that there was "no adequate explanation ... (for the] failure to personally serve
Snyderville West at its known tax address"
and set aside the judgment. In 1989, Snyderville filed a Motion to Dismiss premised on
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), which
was granted. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Weber claims that Snyderville
was effectively served through personal service
upon Jim Gaddis or, alternatively, that it was
properly served by publication. Weber also
challenges the court's order of dismissal in
favor of Snyderville as improper under Utah
R. Civ. P. 52(a)*
PERSONAL SERVICE
Weber asserts that Gaddis's position as
managing partner of Snyderville qualified him
to receive service of process for Snyderville.
Weber further claims that service upon Gaddis
automatically perfected service upon Snyder-

for Snyderville. See Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(!
(service upon a partnership shall be effectiv
through service upon managing or gener;
agent). However, personal service upo
Gaddis did not confer jurisdiction over Snj
derville. Weber incorrectly focuses o
Gaddis's capacity, rather than the import c
the summons served upon him. Any numbe
of agents or partners of Snyderville might b
authorized to receive service for the partnei
ship, yet if no service is ever attempted on th
partnership no service on it can be perfected. 4
Rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce
dure states, with our emphasis: "The summon
shall contain the ... names ... of the parties t
the action ... (and) be directed to the defer:
dant." Gaddis's summons was directed t<
him, not to Snyderville. While this might hav
provided Snyderville with constructive or eve
actual knowledge of the action, the insuffic
ency of process is not thereby cured. See Ston
v. Hicks, 45 N.C. App. 66, 262 S.E.2d 31*
319 (1980) (where one defendant received
summons directed to another defendani
service was ineffective on the receiving def<
ndant even though the caption listed him as
defendant). See generally 62B Am. Jur. 2d Pn
cess section 81 (1990). We hold that servic
of process upon Jim Gaddis in his individu;
capacity did not effect service of proce*
upon, nor confer jurisdiction over, Snyden
ille.
SERVICE BY PUBLICATION
Rule 4 ( 0 0 ) of the Utah Rules of Civ
Procedure, in effect at all times pertinent t
this case, 5 authorized service by publicatio
when personal service is impractical becaus
the
person upon whom service is sought
resides outside of the state, or has
departed from the state, or cannot
after due diligence be found within
the state....
The party desiring service of
process by publication shall file a
motion verified by the oath of such
party or someone in his behalf for
an order of publication. It shall
state the facts authorizing such
service and shall show the efforts
that have been made to obtain
personal service within this state ....
The court shall hear the motion ex
parte and, if satisfied that due diligence has been used to obtain
personal service within this state, or
that efforts to obtain the same
would have been of no avail, shall
order publication of the summons
in a newspaper having general cir-

ulc 4 requires the exercise of "due diligr" to locate the defendant before the court
' authorize service by publication. "Due
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(1)50). See also Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d
) , 1277 n. 13 (Utah 1987).
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confer jurisdiction over Snyderville. See
Hustace v. Kapuni, 6 Haw. App. 241, 718
P.2d 1109, 1116 (1986) (where service by
publication is insufficient, subsequent default
judgment is void ab initio).
DISMISSAL
The thrust of Weber's challenge of the
ultimate dismissal of the complaint as against
Snyderville is that the court failed to "issue a
brief written statement of the ground for its
decision," as is required on all motions
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56
and 59 when the motion is based on more
than one ground." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Weber points out that Snyderville advanced
arguments for dismissal under both Rule
12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) and therefore Rule 52(a)
is applicable. We agree, noting however that
Weber did not raise this issue below.
In Alford v. Utah League of Cities and
Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), we held that failure to protest the trial
court's apparent noncompliance with Rule 52
at the trial level precludes consideration of the
omission on appeal. 1 Weber should have
raised the issue with the trial court, therebygiving the court the opportunity to cure the
problem.
We may affirm the trial court on any proper
ground. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.,
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). Thus, if dismissal in this case can be sustained either on
Rule 12(b)(5) or 12(b)(6) grounds, we will
affirm. Cf. Burnett v. Utah Power & Light
Co., 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990) (where trial
court did not identify reason for dismissal.
Supreme Court assumed dismissal was premised on one or both of the grounds advanced
in motion to dismiss and affirmed after considering only one of those grounds, and determining it was well-taken).
Weber has limited her argument on dismissal insofar as premised on Rule 12(b)(5) to an
incorporation by reference of her arguments
that Snyderville was sufficiently served either
through personal service on Gaddis or by
publication. We have treated these arguments
above and found both to be without merit.
Given the limited scope of Weber's 12(b)(5)
argument, it follows that the order of dismissal should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Because Snyderville West was not properly
served either personally or by publication, the
default judgment entered against it was properly set aside. Because Weber has raised no
argument demonstrating error in dismissal on
Rule 12(b)(5) grounds, the order of dismissal
will not be disturbed. Affirmed.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge

Regnal W. Garff, Judge
1. This action was originally brought by Steven W.
Major, personal representative of the estate of
Robert W. Major, Jr. During the course of the litigation Steven W Major died and the present plaintiff was named as successor personal representative.
2. As may be expected in litigation involving numerous parties and several transactions, the facts
before the court are numerous and complicated. We
commend counsel for both parties for their succinct
presentation of the relevant facts. We further note
that both parties' careful compliance with Utah R.
App. P. 24 has assisted the court in efficiently deciding the matters before it. Of particular assistance
to the court was the comprehensive addenda of key
documents annexed to the briefs.
3. Weber also claims that, notwithstanding any
deficiencies in service of process, Snyderville is
bound by a stipulation for settlement and the judgment entered thereon on January 17, 1986, by
reason of the fact Gaddis, through his own counsel,
was a party to the stipulation. We find no merit in
this argument nor in Weber's lis pendens argument,
raised for the first time in her reply brief.
4. Weber's claim that service on Gaddis was adequate to serve the partnership is belied by Weber's
own course of conduct. If she believed Snyderville
had been properly served through Gaddis there
would have been no need to include it in the motion
seeking leave to serve by publication, in the order
authorizing publication or in .the published
summons, nor to undertake efforts to mail the
published summons to Snyderville.
5. The comparable rule now appears at Utah R.
Civ. P. 4(g).
6. Apparently counsel thought that unless he could
advise the constable of the name and title of a particular person through whom Snyderville could be
served, he could not appropriately seek service of
Snyderville at the address of which he was aware. A
personal visit to the address would presumably have
elicited such information. But such information is
not necessarily required. Had counsel simply advised
the constable to serve Snyderville at its known
address, by and through any "managing or general
agent, or other agent authorized to receive service of
process
" Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(5). one of two
things would have happened, cither of which would
have served counsel's purposes. The return would
have come back indicating service was effected on
Snyderville by and through its managing partner,
Jim Gaddis, in which event personal service would
be complete, or the return would have come back
with an "unable to serve" notation, with explanation
of the constable's failure to locate at the address
any person having knowledge of Snyderville despite
diligent inquiry, in which event the entitlement to
serve by publication would be ironclad given the
extensive other efforts exeried by counsel.
7. We note that any defendant served by publication
has standing to challenge the sufficiency of service
of process, Carlson, 740 P.2d at 1271, even where
authorized by an order which, as here, is not directly attacked.
8. Without minimizing the importance of the written
statement required by Rule 52(a), which acquaints

grounds be I ore the trial court and the court had
filed its written statement as required by Rule 52
we would likely conclude that the omission
harmless error. Cf. Burnett v. Utah Power & L>
Co., 142 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1990) (where trial c(
did not identify reason for dismissal. Supreme Cc
assumed dismissal was premised on one or both
the grounds advanced in motion to dismiss
affirmed after considering only one of tli
grounds, and determining it was well-taken); Taylc
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 168 (L
Ct. App. 1989) (where trial court did not state b
for judgment, appellate court considered grou
advanced in motion for summary judgment
affirmed upon concluding judgment was prop
premised on one of such grounds); Dover Elev.
v. Hill Mangum Investment, 766 P.2d 424, 426
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (where trial court did not s
basis for judgment on stipulated facts, appel
court noted similarity to cross-motions
summary judgment and merely noted that "a *b
written statement of the ground' for the coi
disposition would have been appropriate").
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SNYDERVTLLE WEST,
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INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff/Appellant
"Plaintiff")

has

filed

Brenda

her

February 23, 1990 in this case.

Reply

Major
Brief

Weber

(hereinafter,

of Appellant

dated

As required by Rule 24(c) of the

Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, the Reply Brief is to be
limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing
Brief, being the Brief of Respondent dated February 24, 1990 as

filed by Snyderville West.
As set forth more fully below, Snyderville West contends
that

the

Reply

Brief

of Appellant

should

be disregarded

or

stricken in part because the major part of Plaintiff's Reply
Brief deals with the issue of constructive notice which (a) was
not raised at the trial level, (b) was not raised in Respondent' s
Brief, and (c) which is irrelevant.
Plaintiff's

argument

of

"constructive

notice"

has not

previously been raised in this case before the trial court as
the prior briefs before this court, and therefore Plaintiff is
not

entitled

to

have

its

"constructive

notice"

argument

considered on appeal.
Nor was

the

"constructive

notice"

argument

raised in

Respondent's Brief and therefore pursuant to Rule 24(c) is not a
matter which should now be raised.
The

"constructive

notice"

statute

(§78-40.2,

U. C. A. )

applies only to purchasers subsequent to the recording of a Lis
Pendens, and Snyderville West purchased the subject real property
five years prior to the recording of the Lis Pendens.

I
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S "CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE" ARGUMENT WAS NOT
RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT NOR RAISED IN PRIOR BRIEFS
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT I S NOT
ENTITLED TO BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL AND THEREFORE THAT
PORTION OF P L A I N T I F F ' S
REPLY BRIEF DEALING WITH
"CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE" SHOULD BE DISREGARDED OR STRICKEN.
Issues

or

other

matters

not

otherwise put i n i s s u e at the t r i a l
for the

first

t i m e on a p p e a l .

raised

in

court l e v e l

the

may n o t be

S a l t Lake County v.
- 2 -

pleadings

nor

raised

Carlston,

776

P. 2d 653, 655 (Utah App. 1989); James v. Preston, 746 P. 2d 799,
801 (Utah App. 1987).
As stated by the court

in the James case,

A matter is sufficiently raised if it
has been submitted to the trial court and
the trial court has had the opportunity
to make findings of fact or law.
(Citation omitted).
"Theories or issues
which are not apparent or reasonably
discernable
from the p l e a d i n g s ,
affidavits and exhibits will not be
considered. " I£. at 801.
There must be more than mere

mention of or allusion to

the theory or matter in the record of proceedings before the
trial court.

As stated by the Court of Appeals in the James

case:
For an issue to be sufficiently raised,
even if indirectly, it must at least be
raised to a level of consciousness such
that the trial judge can consider it.
Ifl. , at 802.
Snyderville West' s examination of the record of memoranda
and arguments presented to the trial court below has failed to
disclose any reference to the "constructive notice" argument now
raised by the Plaintiff for the first time in Plaintiff s Reply
Brief,

Further, there was no mention of this issue and argument

in Plaintiff' s Brief of Appellant.

Snyderville West did not

raise or discuss the question of "constructive notice" in its
Brief of Respondent.

Therefore, this new issue is inappropriate

pursuant to Rule 24(c) R. Utah Ct. App.

Section 78-40-2 of Utah

Code Annotated, upon which Plaintiff principally relies in her
Reply Brief, was not cited to or referred to in any previous
- 3 -

memoranda or arguments of Plaintiff or of Snyderville West.

The

matter of "constructive notice11 through recordation of the Lis
Pendens has simply not been an issue in this case.
It is true that Plaintiff has made several references in
her Memoranda, both at the trial court level and before this
court# concerning the existence of the Lis Pendens, for instance
in the several Statements of Facts as cited by Plaintiff, and on
page forty-nine of Plaintiff's Brief of Appellant (".
the Lis Pendens was of record.").

. .while

But these fleeting and benign

references to a document incontrovertibly of record in the Summit
County Recorder' s Office did not constitute by any stretch of the
imagination the equivalent of raising as an argument or issue the
matter of "constructive notice" and Section 78-40-2.

The matter

clearly was sufficiently not raised, and therefore should not be
considered by the Court of Appeals.

James v. Preston, I^L. at

801.

II
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF "CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE" ARGUMENT IS
ERRONEOUS AND IRRELEVANT TO THIS CASE, AND THEREFORE
SHOULD BE DISREGARDED OR STRICKEN BY THIS COURT.
Snyderville West believes
sets

forth

an

erroneous

and

that Plaintiff' s Reply Brief

irrelevant

argument

concerning

"constrictive notice," which argument under Utah law simply does
not properly apply to the facts of this case, and that therefore
Plaintiff s

Reply

Brief

should

be

disregarded

or

stricken

pursuant to Rule 24 (k), R. Utah Ct. App.
The central thrust of Plaintiff s argument as set forth in
- 4 -

her

Reply

Brief

is

that

Snyderville

West

had

"constructive

notice" on the basis of §78-40-2, U. C. A, , by reason of recording
of a Lis Pendens in the Summit County Recorder' s Office on April
11,

1983

(Reply

Brief,

at

page

3, paragraph

9), and

that

therefore (somehow) Snyderville West is bound by the January 17,
1986 judgment.

See, e.g., Plaintiff's "Conclusion" as set forth

in her Reply Brief, at 16-18.
But

Plaintiff

has

apparently

misunderstood

significance and effect of this statute.

the

Snyderville West was

not a subsequent purchaser after the Lis Pendens was recorded,
but

in

fact

Contract

purchased

its

interest

by

Uniform

Real

Estate

(and placed a notice thereof of record) in 1978, five

years before the Lis Pendens was recorded.
Because Snyderville West had purchased the property prior
to the recording of the Lis Pendens, the recording of the Lis
Pendens

had

no

affect

notice whatsoever,

whatsoever,

and

gave

to Snyderville West.

no

constructive

Had Snyderville West

purchased its interest by contract subsequent to April 11, 1983,
then pursuant

to

Section

78-40-2,

Snyderville

West

would be

deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action,
as described in the statute.
of the recording
land

title

statutes

records,

which

This is consistent with the purpose
and Utah's

"Race/Notice"

system of

imparts

subsequent

purchasers

to

knowledge of that which is of record prior to their making their
purchase.
with

But there is nothing whatsoever in the said statute

respect

to

imparting

constructive
- 5 -

notice

to

one

who

purchased property pursuant to a real estate contract prior to
the recording of the Lis Pendens.

As stated in said statute:

"from the time of filing such notice for
record onl y shall a purchaser or
encumbrancer of the property affected
thereby be deemed to have constructive
notice* . . . w (Emphasis added)„
Plaintiff correctly/ but irrelevant!y/ notes that case law
under

the "doctrine

of

Lis

Pendens"

supports

the

statutory

concept of constructive notice to persons subsecruentlv taking an
interest in that property.

See e. g. , Blodgett v. Zions First

National Bank. 752 P. 2d, 901 (Utah Appc

1988), as referred to

and quoted in Plaintiff s Reply Brief, at 7-8.
But under Utah law Snyderville West purchased its real
property interest in 1978 when it entered into its Uniform Real
Estate Contract with the seller and commenced making payments
under the contractget

around

the

Plaintiff in her Reply Brief attempts to

1978

contract

purchase

of

the property

by

Snyderville West by contending, in effect, that Snyderville West
took its interest in the subject seven acres not in 1978, but in
1983 when it received its Warranty Deed from Joseph Krofcheck,
the successor to the 1978 contract seller, in fulfillment of the
terms of the real estate contract.
Under

Utah

law,

under

the

doctrine

of

equitable

conversion, equitable title and the right of ownership of the
property

passed

upon

execution

of

the

Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract in 1978, and all that the seller thereafter held was a
personalty interest in the right to receive the contract proceeds
- 6 -

according

to

the

terms

of

the

contract,

coupled

with the

obligation upon completion of the contract to deliver the deed
confirming title.

For that reason, Plaintiff is incorrect in her

assertion in the paragraph at the bottom of page thirteen, and
elsewhere, in Plaintiff's Reply Brief that "Snyderville West had
only an equitable interest in the seven acres and did not qualify
as a bona fide purchaser who could cut off any earlier legal or
equitable interest. H
The doctrine of equitable conversion as applied to the
purchase

and

sale

of

established in Utah law.

real

property

under

contract

is well

For instance, in Lach v. Deseret Bank,

746 P. 2d 802 (Utah App. 1987), the court stated as follows:
The doctrine of equitable conversion
provides that "an enforceable executory
contract of sale [upon which an action
for specific performance could be
brought] has the effect of converting the
interest of the vendor of real property
to personalty.M
Willson v. State Tax
Commission, 28 Utah 2d 197, 499 P. 2d
1298, 1300 (1972) (Quoting All red v.
Allred, 15 Utah 2d 396, 393 P. 2d 791, 792
(1964)).
The purchaser acquires the
equitable interest in the property at
the moment the contract is created and is
thereafter treated as the owner of the
land.
Jelco, Inc. v. Third Judicial
District Court. 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P. 2d
739, 741 (1973). I£. , at 805.
As stated by the court:
When this agreement was executed, Lach
became the equitable owner of the
property and the judgment debtors, the
Dewsnups, held only a personalty interest
in the property. The Bank7 s docketing of
a judgment against the Dewsnups on
December 12, 1980 [after the execution of
the earnest money agreement] did not
- 7 -

create a judgment lien against the
property because the Dewsnups did not
then have a real property interest to
which the lien could attach.
Under the
uncontroverted facts, and as a matter of
law, Lach owns the property free from any
judgment lien in favor of the Bank . ..
Id. , at 805-806.
See also, e.g., Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P. 2d 1244 (Utah
1987).
The Lach case and the principle of equitable conversion
discussed and applied therein and in numerous other Utah cases
have direct applicability to the present case.

When Snyderville

West purchased the subject seven acres in 1978, it became the
equitable

owner

of the property,

and

the

seller thereafter,

including his successor Joseph Krofcheck, did not have a real
property

interest which any subsequent

Pendens

could

Krofcheck

to

attach.
Snyderville

The

filings such as a Lis

deliverance

West

in

1983

of

the

merely

deed

from

constituted

satisfaction of the obligation under the contract to convey legal
title once the contract was fully paid off, and there was no
delivery of a real property interest which the Lis Pendens could
have affected.
CONCLUSION
For not one but three separate reasons, any one of which
is sufficient, Plaintiff s Reply Brief should be disregarded or
stricken by this court.
First, as required by Rule 24(c), R. Utah Ct. App. , reply
briefs must be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
- 8 -

the opposing brief-

But in this instance Plaintiff s Reply Brief

does not address or purport to answer any new matter set forth in
Snyderville

West' s

Brief

principally

dedicated

to

of

Respondent,

arguing

a

but

wholly

instead

new

is

issue

of

"constructive notice".
Second/

Rule 24(k), R- Utah Ct. App. , requires that all

briefs must be free from irrelevant and immaterial matters.

But

Plaintiff' s Reply Brief is concerned principally with Plaintiff s
new

argument

concerning

"constructive

notice,"

which

is a

spurious and irrelevant argument, immaterial to the outcome of
this

case,

since

under the doctrine

of

equitable

conversion

Snyderville West acquired its real property interest in 1978,
five years prior to the recording of the Lis Pendens, rather than
subsequent to the recording of the Lis Pendens, the situation
with which Section

78-40-2 is solely

concerned.

Plaintiff s

reliance on the cited statute and the "doctrine of Lis Pendens"
is simply not applicable in this case.
Third,

Plaintiffs

"constructive

notice"

argument

and

reliance on Section 78-40-2 was not raised prior, either at the
trial court level or in the prior briefs or arguments before
this

court.

Therefore,

entitled

to be considered

portion

(or

all)

of

Plaintiff' s argument
on appeal.

Plaintiffs

is

simply not

For that reason, that

Reply

Brief

dealing

"constructive notice" should be disregarded or stricken.

- 9 -

with
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^
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against the real property
described in Plaintiff's
Complaint adverse to Plaintiff's
ownership or clouding his title
thereto; PARK CITY WEST
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation;
CITY DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., a
Utah Corporation; STANDARD
INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a
California Corporation; GREAT
NORTHERN LAND CORPORATION, a
California Corporation; INN
INVESTORS, a Partnership; TITLE
INSURANCE AGENCY, a Utah
Corporation; REESE HOWELL;
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN, a Utah
Corporation; JOE COX; JIM
GADDIS; SAM WILSON; HENRY

WINKLER; and JOHN DOES 25
through 50, Inclusive,

)
)

Defendants,

)

and

)

SNYDERVILLE WEST,

)

Defendant/Respondent. )
"BRIEF OF APPELLANT
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) is believed to
be ultimately and finally determinative of this action.

That

statute is set forth in full in the text of the Argument in this
Reply Brief.
RECAPITULATION OF UNDISPUTED RELEVANT FACTS
1.

On July 13, 1978, Investor Associates, by and

through Robert W. Major, Jr. ("Major"), agreed by Uniform Real
Estate Contract

(the

'Contract"x

to sell one eight (8) acre

parcel and one seven (7) acre parce. to Snyderville West.

(Brief

of Appellant, Fact No. 3; Brief of Respondent, Fact No. 1)
2.

The purchase price of

the 7-acre parcel was

$120,000, of which $20,000 was paid on execution of the Contract.
The oalance was to be paid in semi-annual installments of $12,638
until July 1, 1383 wnen the entire remaining balance of principal
and interest was to become due and payable.

(Brief of Appellant,

Fact No. 3; Brief of Respondent, Fact No. 2, Addendum "A" hereto)
3.

Major died March 20, 1980.

(Brief of Appellant,

Fact No. 10; Brief of Respondent, Fact No. 7)

4.

On about April

20, 1980, Joseph L. Krofchek

("Krofchek") induced Zella J. Slagel, Major's mother and a member
of Investor Associates, without authority to execute an Agency
Agreement

appointing

Associates.

Krofchek

General

Agent

of

Investor

1980, Krofchek,

without

(Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 11)
5.

On about

June

6,

authorization, purportedly transferred to himself by Quit Claim
Deed all right, title and interest
Investor Associates.
6.

in property belonging to

(Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 12)

On July

7, 1980, the April

20, 1980 Agency

Agreement and the June 6, 1980 Quit Claim Deed were recorded in
the office of the Summit County Recorder.

(Brief of Appellant,

Fact No. 13)
7.

Gaddis identified a letter to him dated June 17,

1980, from a law firm notifying him of Major's death.

(Brief of

Appellant, Fact No. 14)
8.
commenced

On April

6, 1983, the Personal

Representative

this quiet title action against fifty (50) John Doe

defendants and seventy (70) other named defendants to quiet title
to eleven (11) parcels of land, including the subject seven (7)
acres.

The Personal

Representative

sought,

inter

alia

cancellation of the June 6, 1980 Quit Claim Deed from Investor
Associates to Krofchek.

(Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 17; Brief

of Respondent, Fact No. 15)
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9.

On April

11, 1983, the Personal Representative

caused a Lis Pendens regarding
recorded

the quiet title action to be

in the Summit County Recorder's office.

Appellant, Fact No. 18 - Addendum
10.

(Brief of

,f n

B)

On May 11, 1983, Gaddis was personally served with

Summons and Complaint.

(Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 26; Brief

of Respondent, Facts No. 15 and 17)
11.

On June 21, 1983, attorney Don Strong ("Strong")

filed an answer on behalf of Gaddis and others.

(Brief of

Appellant, Fact No. 28; Brief of Respondent, Fact No. 26)
12.

Gaddis has been the managing partner and "acting

manager" of Snyderville West, a Utah general partnership, since
he organized it July 3, 1978 for the sole purpose of buying the
15 acres at Park West.
(10*)

interest

in

Gaddis retains his original ten percent

Snyderville

West.

Gaddis has

operated

Snyderville West inconspicuously through his business office at
1253 East 2100 South in Salt Lake City.

(Brief of Appellant,

Facts No. 5, 6, 7 and 8; Brief of Respondent, Fact No. 13)
13.
was

recorded,

Cn July 20, 1983, two months after the Lis Pendens
Snyderville

$32,210.10 under the Contract.

West made

the

final payment of

(Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 16;

Brief of Respondent, Fact No. 10)
14.

Cn October 26, 1983, more than six months after

the Lis Pendens was recorded and more than five months -.fter
Gaddis was served. Krofchek. not Investor Associates, conveyed

the

seven

(7) acres by warranty

deed

to Snyderville West.

Shortly thereafter, Title Insurance Agency issued Snyderville
West a policy of title insurance signed by Howell.

The Lis

Pendens was still of record. (Brief of Appellant, Pact No. 29Addendum "C" hereto)
Gaddis1 attorney, Strong, personally participated

15.
in

lengthy

settlement

Representative

and

discussions

twenty-six

among

the

of the developer

Personal

defendants.

(Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 39; Brief of Respondent, Fact No.
27)
16.

On

October

2, 1985, Gaddis, through

Strong,

entered into a complex Stipulation for Settlement which vested
the seven acres in the Personal Representative.

Paragraph 18 of

the Stipulation for Settlement provides:
18.
The parties agree to the entry of
an Order adjudging and decreeing that
Snyderville Land Company is the Owner in fee
simple and entitled to possession of all of
the real property situated in Summit County,
State of U t a h , and m o r e particularly
described in Exhibits "P" and "Q" which are
attached hereto and by this reference made a
part hereof and that Plaintiff is the owner
in fee simple and entitled to possession of
all of the real property situated in Summit
County, State of Utah, and more particularly
described in Exhibit "R" which is attached
hereto and by this reference made a part
hereof; and further adjudging and decreeing
that the claims of all other parties to this
action to any right, title and interest in
and to said real properties, and any part
thereof, are without any right whatever and
that said parties have no right to or
interest in said real properties, or any part
thereof.
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Exhibit

"R" incorporates "A" and "B" by reference.

The seven

acres appears as Parcel No. 6 on page 2 of Exhibit "A".
of Appellant, Facts No. 40 and 42 - Addendum
17.

(Brief

,f

D" hereto)

On January 17, 1986, Judgment was entered quieting

title to the seven acres in the Personal Representative.
attorney approved

the Judgment.

Gaddis1

The Personal Representative

received none of the proceeds from the "Gaddis sale," the sale of
the seven acres.

(Brief of Appellant, Fact No. 43 - Addendum

"E")
(NOTE:

Addendum

"D" to the Brief of Appellant was

assembled backward and is reproduced for the Court's convenience
as Addendum "F" hereto.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
When the Lis Pendens was recorded April 11, 1983 and
when Gaddis was served with process May 11, 1983, Snyderville
West gained both constructive and actual notice and knowledge of
this

pending

litigation

affecting

equitable interest in the seven acres.

Snyderville West's

mere

Nevertheless, Snyderville

West continued to deal with KrofcheK at its own peril concerning
property within tne power and control of the trial court.
Snyderville West had actual and constructive knowledge
that the Personal representative sought to nave the June 6, 1980
Quit Claim Teed from Investor Associates to Krofchek cancelled.
Despite this Knowieage, Snyderville West tcoK Krofchek's Octccer

26, 1983, Warranty Deed and wrongfully claims good title as the
result.
In the Stipulation for Settlement, Gaddis and others
determined Krofchek had no interest in the seven acres.

The

January 17, 1986 Judgment which Gaddis approved confirmed that
determination

and quieted

Personal Representative.

title

to the seven acres

in the

That Judgment binds Snyderville West as

a grantee which took Krofchek's interest in the seven acres with
actual

and

constructive

knowledge

that Krofchek 1 s

interest

therein was subject to whatever disposition the trial court might
make of it.

Snyderville West is bound by the results set forth

in the Judgment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SNYDERVILLE WEST WAS BOUND BY THE
STIPULATION FOR SETTLEMENT AND THE
JANUARY 17, 1986 JUDGMENT ENTERED.
In Point V of its Brief of Respondent, Snyderville West
correctly asserts that the Personal Representative made certain
claims

in her arguments before the lower court.

Representative

claimed

The Personal

that because Gaddis was represented by

attorney Strong, and because Gaddis claimed an interest in the
seven acres only through Snyderville West, that Snyderville West
had actual notice of the results of the action and is bound by
those results.
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Snyderville West asserts on page 32 of its Brief of
Respondent that actual notice of the results of the action is not
sufficient

to bind

assertion fails.

Snyderville West

to the outcome.

That

Snyderville West had actual and constructive

notice of the action and is bound by the results.
A.

The Doctrine of Lis Pendens in Utah
Section 78-40-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953) provides:
78-40-2.

Lis pendens.

In any action affecting the title to, or
the right of possession of, real property the
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint
or thereafter, and the defendant at the time
of filing his answer when affirmative relief
is claimed in such answer, or at any time
afterward, may file for record with the
recorder of the county in which the property
or some part thereof is situated a notice of
the pendency of the action, containing the
names of the parties, the object of the
action or defense, and a description of the
property in that county affected thereby.
From the time cf filing such notice for
record only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer
of the property affected thereby be deemed to
have constructive notice of the pendency of
the action, and oniy of its pendency against
parties designed by their real names.
In Blodgett v. Zions First National Bank, 752 P.2d 901
(Utah App. 1988), Judge Billings discussed the doctrine of lis
pendens.
Under the doctrine of lis pendens, the
f i l i n g of a. lis p e n d e n s s e r v e s as
constructive notice to ail persons that the
rights and interests in tne subject property
are in dispute. Anyone taking an interest in
that property ices so at his :r her own
peril. See Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills,
590 P. 2d 1244. 1248 ( Utan 1979); Baanail -.

Suburbia Land Co, , 579 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah
1978).
Persons who acquire interests in
property that is subject to a lis pendens are
b o u n d by the resul ts of the p e n d i n g
litigation.
Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657
P.2d 1300, 1303 (Utah 1982); see Hidden
Meadows, 590 P.2d at 1248; Baqnall, 579 P.2d
at 916; Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905, 907
(Utah 1975).
752 P.2d at 906.

(Emphasis in original.)

In Blodqett, this Court affirmed

the trial court's

Order of Judgment of Quiet Title and held that the filing of a
lis pendens defeated the rights of judgment assignee, where the
result of the litigation was that the party against whom the
liens were asserted quit claimed any interest she had in the
property.
In Hidden Meadows Development Company v. Mills, 590
P.2d

1244 (Utah 1979), an action for specific performance, the

Utah Supreme Court explained
grantee who

the consequences

that befall a

takes property with knowledge the property is the

subject of on-going litigation.
The sole purpose of recording a lis
pendens is to give constructive notice of the
p e n d e n c y of p r o c e e d i n g s which may be
derogatory to an owner's title or right to
possession.
One who takes with full
knowledge that the property taken is the
subject of on-going litigation acquires oniy
the grantor's interest therein, subject to
whatever disposition the court might make cf
it.
590 ?.2d at 1248.

(Footnotes omitted.)

the lis pendens continued

Justice Kali held that

to be effective pending appeai and

convevances made before the matter was reversed and remanded were
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null

and

void.

That

court

affirmed

the

trial

court's

determination that the lis pendens imparted constructive notice
to the grantees.

That court also affirmed the trial court's

conclusion that the grantees had actual notice of the appeal and
hence were charged with knowledge that the judgment upon which
the conveyances to them were based was subject to reversal.

The

grantees' actual notice was reflected by the fact that one of the
individual defendants was intertwined with the business entity
grantees variously as either president, principal or husband of a
partner.
Likewise, in Tuft v. Federal Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300
(Utah

1982),

determined

a quiet

title action, the Utah Supreme

Court

that grantees who had both actual and constructive

notice of pending litigation regarding which a lis pendens had
been recorded were bound by the results of that suit.

Chief

Justice Hall reiterated the rationale that is the basis for the
doctrine of lis pendens.
. . . This Court recently stated:
The doctrine of lis pendens
preserves the status quo by keeping
the subject of the lawsuit within
the power and control of the court
until judgment or decree shall be
entered.
The recording of a lis
pendens serves as a warning to all
p e r s o n s t h a t any r i g h t s or
interests they may acquire m the
Interim are subject to the judgment
or decree.
[Bagnall v. Suburoia
land Co . , 579 P.2d 914 .1978)]
TEmpnasis added.]

In an earlier case, this Court explained:
The mischief that would follow
if the parties to an action under
such circumstances could alienate
away property which is before the
court for determination is obvious,
[Glynn v. Dubin, 13 Utah 2d 163,
369 P.2d 930 (1962)]
Accordingly, we have recognized the doctrine
of lis pendens in a number of recent cases.
[Bastian v. Cedar Hills Investment & Land
Co, , Utah, 632 P. 2d 818 (1981); Boyce v.
Boyce, Utah, 609 P.2d 928 (1980); Hidden
Meadows Development Co. v. Mills, supra, n.
1; Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., supra, n. 2;
Hansen v. Kohler, Utah, 550 P. 2d 186 (1976);
Harvey v. Sanders, Utah, 534 P.2d 905
(1975).]
657 P.2d at 1302.
As
notice

in Hidden Meadows, supra, the grantees' actual

in Tuft was

individual

reflected

defendants

grantees as officers

were

by the

fact

intertwined

and stockholders.

that

with

two of the

the

Chief Justice Hall

concluded:
. . . In light of the active involvement of
the Butchers as stockholders and officers m
both corporations, the Butchers1 knowledge
concerning the foreclosure suit may fairly be
imputed to the corporations themselves. This
actual knowledge concerning the pendency of
litigation involving the property acquired by
3ayshore Inn and Federal Leasing subjects
them to the results of that litigation in the
same way that the constructive knowledge
imparted by the lis pendens does.
Because Baysnore Ir.n and Federal Leasing
nad both actual and constructive notice of
the pendency of the foreclosure suit at tne
time they acquired their successive interests
in the property, they are bound by the
1C

corporate

results of that suit.
The trial court
properly quieted title in plaintiff on that
basis.
Ibid., p. 1303.

(Footnotes omitted.)

A grantee whose interest in real property is cut off by
reason of actual and constructive notice of litigation affecting
title to that property need not be a party to that litigation.
In Glynn v. Dubin, 369 P.2d 930 (Utah 1962), a partition action,
the grantee was counsel
maintenance action.

for the husband

in a prior separate

In that separate maintenance action, the

wife had recorded a lis pendens identifying the subject property.
Just hours thereafter, the husband had conveyed the property to
his counsel

in payment

of

legal

fees.

After

the

separate

maintenance action was concluded, the attorney sued the wife for
partition and to quiet title.

The Utah Supreme Court opined:

It is our opinion that this property being
within the jurisdiction of the court, having
been thus committed to it for the purpose of
adjudication, Dr. Dubin could not make any
c o n v e y a n c e thereof except subject to
adjudication by the court.
369 ?.2d at 931.

That court concluded:

Inasmuch as the only interest in the
property he could take by the deed from Dr.
Dubin was whatever interest the latter
finally had adjudicated to him, and that
turned out to be nothing, the trial court
correctly dismissed his complaint and awarded
judgment quieting title in said property to
the defendant.

In summary, the doctrine of lis pendens in Utah binds
those parties and non-parties with actual and constructive notice
of

pending

litigation affecting

title to, or

the right

to

possession of, real property to the results of that litigation.
A grantee with such actual and constructive notice acquires only
the grantor's interest therein, subject to whatever disposition
the court might make of it.
party

The mischief that would follow if a

to such an action could alienate away property which is

before the court for determination is obvious in this case.
Actual and Constructive Notice in this Case
Snyderville West had actual and constructive notice of
this litigation affecting title to the seven acres before it took
Krofchek's October 26, 1983 Warranty Deed.

Snyderville West is

thereby bound to the results of this litigation set forth in the
Stipulation for Settlement and in the January 17, 1986 Judgment.
Gaddis was personally served with summons and complaint
on May 11, 1983.

Gaddis was Snyderville West's managing partner

and "acting manager" at the time.

Gaddis' only interest in the

seven acres derived solely from his ten percent (10%) interest in
Snyderville West.

Gaddis was intertwined with Snyderville West

in such a manner

that his actual knowledge

of

the

pending

litigation may fairly be imputed to the general partnership.
On June 21, 1983 Gaddis answered the complaint through
his attorney, Don Strong.
participated

in

lengthy

In late 1985, Gaddis, through Strong,
settlement
12

negotiations.

Those

negotiations
Strong,

of

Settlement.

culminated

in Gaddis 1

the complex

October

approval, again

2,

1985

through

Stipulation

for

On January 17, 1986, Gaddis similarly approved the

Judgment which the trial court entered.

The Judgment quieted

title to the seven acres in the Personal Representative.

In the

face of these undisputed facts, Gaddis' claim that it was not
until October 22, 1987 that Snyderville West learned it no longer
had any interest in the seven acres is disingenuous to say the
least.
As in Hidden Meadows and Tuft, supra, Snyderville West
had actual notice through its principal Gaddis of the quiet title
Gaddis1 knowledge concerning the suit, as well as his

action.

approval of the results, may fairly be imputed to Snyderville
West.

This

actual

knowledge

concerning

the pendency of

litigation involving the seven acres subjects Snyderville West to
the

results

of

that

litigation

in the same way

that

the

constructive knowledge imparted by the April 11, 1983 Lis Pendens
does.
Snyderville

West

had

only

an executory

contract

interest in the seven acres when Gaddis was personally served May
11, 1983.

Snyderville West still owed about twenty-seven percent

(27%) of the purchase price, or $32,000.

Consequently, at the

time it received actual notice of the pending litigation through
Gaddis, Snyderville West had only an equitable interest in the
seven acres and did not qualify as a bona fide purchaser who
1 ^

could cut off any earlier legal or equitable interest.

Gregerson

v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396 (Utah 1983).
In the April 6, 1983 complaint with which Gaddis was
served,

the Personal

Representative

sought,

inter alia,

cancellation of the June 6, 1980 Quit Claim Deed from Investor
Associates to Krofchek.

Thus, through service of the complaint

on Gaddis, Snyderville West had actual notice that any interest
Krofchek might claim in the seven acres was suspect.
Nevertheless, on July 20, 1983, Snyderville West made
the final payment of $32,210.10 under the Contract.

On October

26, 1983, Krofchek, not Investor Associates with whom Snyderville
West had contracted, conveyed
West.

Shortly

thereafter,

the seven acres to Snyderville
Title

Insurance Agency

issued

Snyderville West a policy of title insurance signed by Howell.
The Stipulation for Settlement and the Judgment which
eventually resolved all questions ot title both clearly provide
that

title

to

Representative.

the seven acres be quieted

in

the Personal

The Judgment provides that M(t)he claims of all

of the Defendants (including Krofchek) . . . and all claiming by,
through or under them

. . are without any right whatever and

said parties (including KrofcheK) have no right to or interest in
said

real properties, and any part thereof."

Addendum

n

(Judgment, 1 3-

E" hereto)
One of the results of the quiet title litigation was

that Krorchek r^as determined to have no right to or interest
14

m

the seven acres.

Snyderville West acquired Krofchek's interest:

nothing.
Snyderville West may have a claim for loss arising
under its title insurance policy or against Krofchek, but it has
no claim to any right, title or interest in the seven acres
quieted in the Personal Representative.

The trial court erred in

determining the January 16, 1986 Judgment void as to Snyderville
West.
Constructive Notice
The Lis Pendens pertaining to this action was recorded
April 11, 1983.

In accordance with Section 78-40-2, Utah Code

Ann. (1953), from the time of filing Snyderville West is deemed
to have had constructive notice of the pendency of the action
affecting the seven acres.
The seven acres appeared as Parcel No. 5 in the Lis
Pendens as in the complaint.

Krofchek is designated as J. L.

Krofchek a/k/a Joseph 1. Krofchek.

The October 26, 1983 Warranty

Deed to Snyderville West was executed by Joseph L. Krofchek.
The seven acres were within the power and control of
the trial court until the January 17, 1986 Judgment was entered.
Hence,

Snyderville

West

took Krofchek's

"interest"

in the

property at its own peril, subject to whatever disposition the
trial court might make of it.
disposition

Snyderville West is bound by the

the trial court made of

Personal Representative.

the seven acres to the

When it made its final payment of $32,210.10 to Title
Insurance Agency on July 20, 1983, Snyderville West had actual
and constructive knowledge that its equitable interest was
subject to the outcome of the pending litigation.

When it took

Krofchekfs Warranty Deed to the seven acres, Snyderville West had
actual

and

constructive

knowledge

that

the

Personal

Representative sought to have the June 6, 1980 Quit Claim Deed
from Investor Associates to Krofchek cancelled.

Nevertheless,

Snyderville West proceeded at its own peril to join Krofchek in
alienating away property which was before the trial court for
disposition.
Snyderville West's argument that it was never served is
nothing but elaborate diversionary obfuscation.

Through it

Snyderville West attempts to profit from the mischief it
participated in creating by alienating away the subject seven
acres that were before the trial court for determination.

That

attempt must fail.
CONCLUSION
At the time this quiet title action was commenced,
Snyderville West had only an equitable contract interest in the
seven acres.

Through service of the summons and complaint on its

principal, Gaddis, and through recording of the Lis Pendens,
Snyderville West had actual and constructive knowledge of the
pending

litigation

affecting

title

to the seven acres.

Snyderville West also had actual and constructive knowledge that
16

the Personal Representative sought to have the June 6, 1980 Quit
Claim Deed from Investor Associates to Krofchek cancelled.
Snyderville West had actual and constructive knowledge
that

Krofchek's

interest

in the seven acres was suspect.

Nevertheless, Snyderville West continued to deal with Krofchek at
its own peril concerning property within the power and control of
the trial court.
Inasmuch
Snyderville

West

as the only
could

interest

in the seven acres

take by the deed

from

Krofchek was

whatever interest the latter finally had adjudicated to him, and
that turned out to be nothing, the trial court erred in setting
aside the January

17, 1986 Judgment as void with respect to

Snyderville West.

If Snyderville West had had a legal rather

than equitable interest in the seven acres when this action was
commenced, the issue of whether Snyderville West was duly served
with process would be relevant.
remained
interest

executory,
in

the

However, where the Contract

Snyderville West

property

and

the

had

only an equitable

issues

of

actual

constructive notice and knowledge are determinative.

and

It cannot

be disputed that these issues must be resolved in favor of the
Personal Representatives and against Snyderville West.
This

Court

should

reverse

the

trial

court's

interlocutory Order entered Novemoer 15, 1988, setting aside the
August 29, 1985. default judgment and the January 17, 1986 final

Judgment

as to Snyderville West.

The Court should vacate the

July 5, 1989 Order dismissing the action as to Snyderville West.
DATED this 23rd day of February, 1990.
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ADDENDUM
A.

July 13, 1978 Uniform Real Estate Contract

B.

April 11, 1983 Lis Pendens

C.

October 26, 1983 Warranty Deed from Krofchek to Snyderville
West

D.

October 2, 1985 Stipulation
sections and Exhibits

E.

January 17, 1986 Judgment - Relevant sections and Exhibits

F.

Addendum
order

for

"D" to Brief of Appellant

Settlement

- Relevant

reproduced in correct

*^<S !S A u£3/»U. v Sf.C s i - CC^r»^CT

!P NOT UN0g»5TCC0 b££K CCMPiTtNT A0VICE-*

UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
L THIS AGREEMENT, made in d u p . n u this.

b r an* i»tw««

fj

. day of.

,7nly

, A. D., 19-

IMVESTOF AS5CCTrs

hmtnafter designated as the Seller, and

gWPPTyTTTF ' • T ^

fc^-^/t^w

n r < Fast 7700 South. SLC. Utah 8M106 ri87-"i2361

^ .. .1.. »••„.. ./

a p s m f r r w t M n ^ f.Tan-ag CaHHig o f

^

2. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer,
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following descno«d real property, situate in
the count/ of .

ciLTnlt

tt/ u»,h_
_. St*.**
State of
Utah, to-witi
to-wtt:

unlirrroved land
Aooacse

Mora parncuiariy describe* as follows: p-jrsuant to l e g a l description attached nereto, to w i t :

•n

zt&rzzTr POP, DICFESS
zz?zzs & i/nLrrizs

W^

IIICLLTED in the foregoing grant, is an easement for ingress,
eeress and underground utilities, to be used in ccrrron with other
far

landowners in the said vicinity, described as follows:

(*ye

EEGIMTJTMC at a ccint which is located on the southerly
boundary line of Park City West Plat No. 1, equidistant
between the westerly and easterly lines of "Brook Ave."
depicted en the official olat of said subdivision;
THENCE, thirty feet (30 ft.) each side of a centerline
which proceeds Scuth from said ooint of beginning, for
a distance of 3?1.C0 feet, rrore or less, to the south
line of the real crccerty parcel described in the said
foregoing grant nsrein; ccrorising a roadway 50.00 feet
in width for said curccses first acove senticned.

stric
cash

Ccawenci
shall b<
renainir

Interest
tire

Part of the Southwest quarter of Sect:
31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, part of the Northwest
qu**_ter Section 6, Township 2 South. •
:e 4 East and a part of Northeast quarter of Section 1,
low-isnip 2 South, Range 3 East of the
Beginning
t Lake Base and Meridian described as follows:
at '.he Southwest corner of Section 31.
unship 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian
Summit County, Utah, and running then; a :< orth along Sect ion line 502.3 feet; thence East 850.00
feet; tnence South 138.00 feet; thencs \*e st 482.30 feet; Chence South 0*17'58" East 474.93 feet to
the Southerly boundarv of Seller's la:
thence South 57 °30' West 32.3 feet; thence South 81°40*
West 2^9.5 feet; thence North 27°28' *•
: 1C0.6 feet to the West line of above mentioned Section 6
thence North 0°30' East S2.4 feet to rcir.t of beginning.

j^\,U~
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t
9 r,y> P ep *nnum and payable in regular monthly installments; provtaed that the agrregate monthly installment
payments required to be made oy Seller on said loans snail not be greater than eacn instalment payment required 10 o«
made by the 3uy»>r unaer this contract, ft nen the principal due hereunder has been reouced to the amount of anv such
loans ana mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above descnoed property
subject to said loans ana mortgages.
9. If the Buyer aestres to exercise hu r.xr.t through accelerated payments under this agreement to pav off any oougations outstanding at date of :his agreeoent against said property, it shall be the Buyers ooiigauon to assume and
pay any penalty wnich may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in resoect
to obligations against saia property lrcsrred oy setter, after date of this agreement, snaii be paid by setter un>esa
said obligations are assumed or approver ay buyer.
10. The Buyer agrees upon written recuest of the Seller to make aopiicatzon to a reliable lenuer for a loan of su:h
amount as can be secured unaer the regulations of said lender and hereoy agTees to aopiy any amount so received uoon
the purcnase price aoove mentioned, ana *-o execute the papers required and pay one-naif the expenses necessary *n obtaining saia loan, the Seller agreeing to ?&f the other one-naif, provided however, that the monthiy payments and
interest rate required, snail not exceed Ue montnly payments and interest rate as outlined above.
11. T>e Buyer agrees to pay all taxes ana assessments of every kind and nature wmen are or which may b» assessed
and whica may become aue on these premises aunng tne life oi this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following:

none

here
here

^uyer

and

ja*e in

the
„*£:

MOP

^

IS
3

Sa~d Buyer hereov agrees to enter i"* o possession ana pay t*o- sa a descnDed premises the sum of

for 1" acres, urcer rricr Jure l c

l g 78

-e-crsrcr azree-ent =

( ayaoie at the office 01 Seller his assijrra or orcer • 3 1 2 C . : C 0
23, f7",

stnctiy w h i n the following times to wi • cr. *L2J

CC ZZS~> n a V J T g ^ l e a s e d
^~w

a

^

^nc^

^

tcta i

~~

:g&1£; ^ 2t-Qt0CG.r*n »
^,^,

cash, the receipt of whicn ia hereoy acknowledged, and the balance of * i n n j n P 0 . 0 0

n

f

3 acres

t~g~c:\

rs ?0 J ^ p n n<>

>

shall be paid as follows

CcncDenci-^ July 1, 1Q79, paments equal to $12,D38 00 eacn, including princiDal and nteresc
shall be oaid semi-an-uallv (Jvuiarv U t ind Jul/ 1st) until July 1, 1983 when the entire
remainirg balance or principal and interest shall beccze due and pa/aole

4

it

~~ •—oa

Fosaftiaion of said premises snail o« aenverea us su\er arvvx

day ol .

S a d monthly payment* arc 'o be ace ed / ir3t *o • - • p a r r * : : c' Verest anc second to *"e ^eduction of

pnnc rax.

"tereat shau ne cnar^«*i "-om

^ - ^

• 3 r g ?'?-
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on ail unpaia portions JI -e

purc"is» nr-ce at the *-a e or VT**~>W"
e r cent (
9
*" ) ^e* annum T v e 3 u / e r at lis oow on at an •** —e
rrav - a v amounts in exwC->s of *e r nontm / - > a\-*ents ucon ~e --~a c -a-a-'ce suoject o "e iim aL.ona ot an> rncr-raj-e
o- cc~ -a— 3v the Bj\e'- "<"••!" u assumed s u e M °ss to ce a m ea * -»- .o unpaid pr rv. rai or in pr-TJavment or e+ _re
l n s t a i ^ e - i s at the eiec c oi " e surer wr c * * c on must ce "-ace a. _re m e tne excess oa>nient s —aae
* « understood a~d ae**e°d nat u u e v e e r accept - a v - e " —m *e Bu>er on "is corf-act ie->s than accor" r ?
*0 • - • .»—~s rieretn rre*" onea n en ov 30 ^0 ~z it "vul n -o *a a <»- -e te r ms of -e contract as o *ne ' o r e tu-e
here - a . «- 3tipuiatea 0" as to anv otner remedies or he set eIw J understooa

"at t k e r e presentl> ex « J an ooutrat on asra zs iaid property in 'avor of .
cn°

rre

with an unpaid balance of

as of .

Se le** represents t-at T e r o are no -."-a a ^oec al r,*"'~-^•'-*e',' «—~» taxes coven^c morovemf's *o said or*"n
lses r o T n ne process -> oeinjf ns-alled or * n en nave ocen "or*p e.*^ a-J -ot paid for ou standing a^airst sa d orop
ert\ ez-*s f
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he follovurc
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w

t e ODt on to sec--e -»TecJte and -nain-a a ca^s secured b> said prooerty of not to ex^ea »-e

-hen -n^aid contract -a a^ce he-«-r2er nea- -z

" er«»3t a

u

*» -a e o' -,o

0 exceed

^

pp»-cent

(
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pa r^e'-s -<*qj red to ' , - ~n u D\ •> ler on i
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o 00 ra o-s against »a a proc *^•^ " c ^ e
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s
agreement
s
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paid oy oeher -r ess
said 3C r a t ons are ^««--"ed or a^oroved 2 ""- p r
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"• ^-<» 3 u \ e r a ? " " « jcon *- " e n "o ?* 0' he Se *- "> -"axe aoot cat on to a -• aoie leruer for a loan o u n
arrou**. as an ne 3e''-'•" , ' -nder "«» retr a _ 1 ^f ^aid e" e- a^a e-*nv a^-ees to acp / anv amount «o receiv»a „oon
*e n --^ras»» n r ce acov» -"•ntion*wi and 0 a * - e ,k, e pnp»-* -• >. - ^ a-u Day one na
**e exsenses "'ece•^^arv - o
a i n i r r s-a 1 con tne -* er atr-^firs: o pay -e ^t K er ore a ' "OT-ued ^owever
"at he monuuy oa>ments a" 1
n eres: T e -equired « =i 1 not »x~e-pd "he — - - j pa>r"e"-3 a~a rt^-*st rate as out i-ed aoove
1
'P'e Buyer a c » " o pa> ail taxes a^s assessmenis 0' • »nr t r d and nature
"*n en are or -wnicn n y b- asse3«ed
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~~z h<» ' • <->f - a az'*<ment. T v e Sener hereoy covenants ana arrees
r a t i e - « a-e no asa<33""«nw3 asra rat said pre"* ses •xceot ~e 'oi O T " I ?

12. The Buver agrees to pa\ tne p n r r

date hereof

13. The Buyer further agre-s to keep a*, ."-surable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com*
pany acceptable to the Seller m the amour.: of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract. ;r * ^ y ** nnri
and to assign said insurance to tne Seller as .v.s interests may appear and to deliver the insurance coney to mm/
14. In the event the Buver snail default in the payment of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance
premiums as herein provided, tne Seller ma v. at his option, pav said taxes, assessments and insurance premiums or either
of them, and if Seller elects so to do, tnen tne Buver agrees to repay the Seller upon demand. a_ «^ca sums so advanced
and paid by him. tog-ether witn interest trereon from date of payment of said sums at the rate of *» of one percent per
month until paid.
15. Buver agrees that he will not commit or suffer to be committed any waste, spoil, or cestraetion in or upon
said premises, and that he wni maintain sa:c premises in good condition.
16. In the event of a failure to commy «Ttn the terms hereof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make
•*M y p
anv payment or payments wnen the same srail become due. or within
. a ays thereafter, the
Seller, at his option snail have tne followirsr alternative remedies:
A. Seller shall have tne rr-.:. upon fauure of the Buyer to remedy the default within five Cirs alter written notice,
to be released from ait obturations ir. .aw and in equity to convev said propertv, anc a_ payments wnich have
been made theretofore on tnis contract bv the Buver. shall be forfeited to the Seller as uquioated damages for
the noii-nerformance of tne contract, and the Buver agrees that the Seller may at h:s or^oo re-enter and take
possession of said premises without t eral processes as in its first and former estate, torstaer with ail imorovements and additions mace by the 3u\er thereon, and the said additions and improvements soah remain witn
the land become the property of :r.e Seller, the Buyer becoming- at once a tenant at *=rui of tne Seller; or
B. The Seller may bring suit and recover judgment for all delinquent installments, indues? costs and attorneys
fees. (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller, at nis option, from resornnff
to one of the other remedies nereuncer in the event of a subsequent default): or
C. The Seller shall have tne right, at r.is ootion, and upon written notice to the Buyer, to c»dare the entire unpaid
balance hereunder at once due and ravable, and may elect to treat this contract as a note ana mortgage, and pass
title to the Buyer suoject tnereto, anc proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah, anc nave the propertv sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing,
including- costs and attornev s fees- and the Seller mav have a judgment for anv oeilcencT wmen may remain.
In the case of foreclosure, the Sene- hereunder, upon the filing of a complaint, shall o* immediately entitled to
the appointment of a receive*- to take possession of said mortgaged propertv and collect tee rents, issues and
profits therefrom ara appu tne «ame to the payment of the obligation nereunder o- :o.d tne same pursuant
to order of the court: arc tne Sen*r uoon entrv of judgment of foreclosure, snail be ensued to the possession
of the said premises cunr.g tne penoc c: redemption.
17. It is agreed that time is the essence oi this agreement.
18. In the event there are a^v liens or ercumorances against said premises otner than those cerein provided for or
referred to, or in the event anv nens or encumbrances other than herein provided for snail herttrter accrue against the
same by acts or neglect of tne Se»ier, then me 5u>er may, at his option, pay and discharge tne same and receive credit
on the amount then remaining cue hereur.cer in the amount of any sucn payment or payments and thereafter the payments herein provided to be rrace. may, at tre option of the Buyer, be suspended until sucn tsne as sucn suspended
payments shall equal anv sums advanced as aroresaid.
19. The Seller on recemrg the pavrre~.ts nerem reserved to be paid at the time and in the scanner above mentioned
agrees to execute and deliver to tne 3uyer n~ assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveym? the title to the
above described premises fre* arc clear of s., encumbrances except as herein .mentioned and exrto: as may nave accrued
by or tnrough the acts or neg ect of the Buv*r and to furnisn at W expense", a poncy of title .nsjrance in tne amount
of the purchase price or at the option of the >* .e-. an abstract brought to date at time of sale or a; any time during the
term of this agreement, or a: t.ne of de.nery of deed, at the option of Buver.
20. It is herebv expressiv understood a-a acreed by the parties hereto that the Buver accepts the said property
in its present condition and that mere are .no representations, covenants, or agreements between tee parties hereto with

reference to said property except as herein scecificallj set forth or attached hereto

S e e «-CtISrTJrn H e r e t o

21. The Buver and Seller eacn agree '."i: srouid they default in anv of the covenants or acreements contained herein, that the defaulting pa-:- s-a.i ca\ a». r~«*_s and expenses, including a reasonable attome-s fee. wnich mav arise
or accrue from enforcing tri« ag-»»'nent o- - eouiining possession of the premises covered ne-eev, o* in pursuing anv
rem***!; provided hercunair c- or tn»» st-v-ii* of thr Suite of Utah whether sucn rcmcd) i« pursued bv filing a suit
or otherwise
22. It is understood thit me stipuiat o-s amresaid are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assitrrs of the T?s~*<:zire par:.e« -*-»to
IN WITNESS WHERECF me saia rar..es to this agreement have nereunto signed tneir names, tne day and year
first aoove written. y>
/
Signed m tne presence of
f
/

_zl

V>

,/Z^CXLC
Seller

7
Buver
>ll

:
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e •: = •!
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-"^EI/W r"r~ L"*JTFOFp'? FE-J1 FSTarrE ^*'T°- r "

IT IE FITTER AGPZZr, that In connection v/i:h the subject Unifcm
Peal Estate Ccntrac:

^o C 0 r , t -

I anop*-(?

oo

rc«^»^r

en or before Serrtcrner «?, i l ' / - , tnc
substituting the carce' ^"* crcoertv shown en Exhibit "-" hereto ids
ied as the "1C.1Z2 acres", in place of the real property er.bracir.r
acres annexed to tr.e face of the said Uniform Heal Estate Contract.
FI*HZ-JLR,

within 90 days from and after any substitution by Buyer

of the Exhibit !\;M property, referred to above, Euyer shall substitute
the oarcel cf realty z'r^r^ on Exhibit

rf ,!

B hereto in clace of the said

Exhibit "-" oroce^t"* "*"* *"~e event the Seller herein accuires naricetadle
t i t l e to said Exhibit "B" land ccnsrislra "1C+- acres 1 '.
IT IE ACI'C'.TZTGED Z" the parties that the fcreroir^ ri^h'ts

c:

substitution are contingent upon S e l l e r ' s current negotiations,
rtade in good faith, with one Taylor Lott and ?.ee6 Gas kin, result
in S e l l e r ' s acquisition cf the said r e a l property delineated cr. sal:
exhibits. Should Selle*" -ccuire said oarcels decicted en the exr
hereto, the L'r.ifcrr. Peal Estate Contract shall be transferred t:
secured cv sucr. """^suitircr 1C acre t r a c t oursuant tc tr.e final l*c
and/cr Caskir. azreernent; and, after the Euyer has r e r l t t ad not I
one-half the outstanding t r i n c i p a i balance cue, plus izzr'^ed in:
-•lo-:
under the said Vnifcrr. real Estate Contract, Buyer snail be enti

a release cf tr.e westerly one-ha If cf that 10 acre parcel which
finally substituted as hereinabove provided. Ctherv/ise, the sue:
cntract shall renain un.O f ' < V = ^ - 3 ^
l*\ day z: July, 1973.
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Seer.

.NCTE: Sellers shall have
the rignt to lssrove a
roadway-utility access
througn the entire property shewn hereon, in
order to provide access
froa Highway 2W, to the
land westerly of the
"17.12 acre" parcel. She
cose within the buyer's
boundaries shall be borne
by the buyer with that
portion outside buyer's
land to be beme by the
seller. Seller has the "
right to advance the costs
and Install the rcac^ay
before buyer's development, according to buyer's
master plat (approved by
County), but buyer n s t
reizriburse seller for said
advanced costs within
SO d2ys after cczaieticrv
of said izsrovessnts.
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:~crri*r m rod ior Summit County. St-Me of Utah,
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ALAN S F H : G C V . S:J--'.flT COMET-CORDS* #

| neOUEST Or
TELEPHONE

q3£~4

tfJi±JL^^-U^^_.

(801> 5 2 1 * 3 8 0 0

IN THE

PtCOROcD
J£?:
THI'RI.) JUDICIAL
DISTRICT

COURT

at
OF

4!3£

±

SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ST* •:/

^.\JOR, Icr.v;^

- sentative of the Estate of
i..I W. MAJOR, JR., Deceased,
I?

\b

19
20
21
22
23
24

L I S PENDENS

r xdiiiLXI f ,

ENGLISH i:,tN CO., i ^ . , a Utah
Corporation; PARK CITY UTAH
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation
CHARLES E. HIRSCH; HAROLD D.
HIRSCH; SAM A- HEPNER, EUGENE H.
POWERT; MASASHI HASHIDA; J. E.
ROBERTS a/k/a JACK E. ROBERTS,
FROSTWOOD LIMITED, a Utah
Limited Partnership; J. LKROFCHECK a/k/a JOSEPH L.
KROFCHECK; ROBERT L. BARRETT;
SNYDERVILLE WEST; PARTNERSHIP
INVESTMENT OF COLORADO, INC., a
Corporation; PARK WEST WATER
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Non-Profit
Corporation; HALBET ENGINEERING,
INC., a California Corporation;
HALBET PROPERTIES, INC., a Utah
Corporation; MAJOR-BLAKENEY
CORPORATION, a California

I11 1 I

HU

Zte*.

BOOKM 2 57PAGE23*>

^7

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Corporation; ASPEN GROVE, INC., a
Utah Corporation; LESTER F.
HEWLETT, JR.; RUTH BRAZIER HEWLETT;
SNYDERVILLE LAND CO. , a Utah
Limited Partnership; H. E. BABCOCK
and J. E. ROBERTS d/b/a PARKWEST
LAND COMPANY, INVESTOR ASSOCIATES,
SYNDICATE, a Delaware Unincorporated Association; WILLIAM S.
RICHARDS; MURRAY FIRST THRIFT AND
LOAN COMPANY, a Utah Corporation;
J. ROBERT WEST; LIFE RESOURCES,.
INC., an Oregon Corporation; KARL
C. LESUEUR; H. J. SAPERSTEIN,
TRUSTEE; PEOPLES FINANCE & THRIFT
COMPANY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a Utah
Corporation; WAYLAND P. CALKINS;
BARBARA CALKINS; McGHIE LAND TITLE
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
Trustee, AVCO FINANCIAL SERVICES
OF UTAH, INC., a Utah Corporation;
JOHN CANEPARI; KERRY D. BODILY;
SKI PARK CITY NEST, INC., a Utah
Corporation; NATIONAL PROPERTY
MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah Corporation; ENSIGN COMPANY, a California
Limited Partnership; ROBERT W.
ENSIGN; CITY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, a Corporation;
WESTERN STATES TITLE COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation; J. TAYLOR LOTT
a/k/a JOHN TAYLOR LOTT; UTAH TITLE
& ABSTRACT COMPANY, a Utah
Corporation; PARK WEST ASSOCIATES,
a Utah General Partnership; JAMES
WEBSTER ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah
Corporation; JAY BAKER d/b/a JAY
BAKER ELECTRIC; RYDER STILLWELL;
DIANA L. LESUEUR; A. J, SLAGEL
a/k/a ZELLA J. SLAGEL; RAY WINN;
JOHN MULLER; GERALD W. WALTERS;
NEW YORK INVESTORS, INC., a New
York Corporation; MICHAEL SPURLOCK;
DORIE SPURLOCK; MARIA KROFCHECK;
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 24, Inclusive;
and all other persons unknown
claiming any right, title, or
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ss.

3

On t h i s ^ 5 ^ ^ day of A p r i l ,

1983, p e r s o n a l l y

4

b e f o r e me ROBERT F ORTON, s i q n e r

5

who dul', icknowl edieci t o me t h a t he e x e c u t e d t h e same

Df t h e t o r e g o i n q

appeared

Instrument,

6
7

frdUj

8

idUL*a

"NOTARY PUBLIC

.4

Residing a t

A
r
, M 0 o " fi5 COMMISSION EXPIRES:

Icr+Jo

11

13-

OF

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
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F i r t o f r h e S o u t r e s t <,t r r c r o f S i f i o i J J " c m s h i p 1 S o u t h , F inge* 4 F a s t y
p a r t Oi t h e Aorty -est q ^ p r t e r Section 6, It unship 2 South, Range '» East, and
p a i t of N o r t h e a s t q u a r t e r of Section 1, Township 2 SouLh, Range 3 Eist ol r h e
S a l t Lake Base ar i M e n c i n n describ2d as follows.
Beginning at the SouthwcGv.
c o r n e r of Section. J l , To-nship 1 South, Kan^e 4 E a s t , S a l t Lake Base and l l e r i d i c a , Suaunic County, Utah, and running thence Nort-h along Section J inc J 0 ? . 3
f o o t ; thence Last 850.03 f r e t ; thence SOULU 13S.0U f e e t ; thence West AS?.80
f e e t ; thence South 0 ° 1 7 ' 5 S " Last 474.93 feet to t h e S o u t h e r l y boundary of S o l i d
I n r J , thence South 57°30' West 32.8 f e e t ; thence South 01 o 40* 1'CSL ?99.5 f e e t ;
\
-, e ^ n i
, o r r r r
r
r } -, s r o f p ' ' i'»ovo n c n t i o i r I
rv

interest in or lien against the real
property described in Plaintiff's
Complaint adverse to Plaintiff's
ownership or clouding his title
thereto; PARK CITY WEST ASSOCIATION,
a Utah Corporation; CITY DEVELOPMENT
CO., INC., a Utah Corporation;
STANDARD INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a
California Corporation; GREAT
NORTHERN LAND CORPORATION, a
California Corporation; INN
INVESTORS, a Partnership; TITLE
INSURANCE AGENCY, a Utah Corporation;
REESE HOWELL; AMERICAN SAVINGS &
LOAN, a Utah Corporation; JOE COX;
JIM GADDIS; SAM WILSON; HENRY
WINKLER; and JOHN ZOES 25 through
50, Inclusive,
Defendants.

TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Notice is hereby given that an action has been commenced
in the above-entitled Court, by the above-named Plaintiff against
the above-named Defendants, which suit is now pending; that one of
the objects of said suit is to quiet title in the Estate of Robert
W. Major, Jr., Deceased, to real property situated in Summit
County, State of Utah, specifically described in Exhibit "A" which
is attached hereto.
DATED THIS S ^

day of April, 1983.

ROBERT F. ORTON
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
Attorneys for Plaintiff

B00KM2 57PAGE23 8
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Parcel 'No. 7:
r t c rK,»w oinrter oc Section 36, Township 1 South,
The Southeast quarter of the Sout u
ar
^ . ^ fecc
^
^
Rani£>e 3 East, Salt Lake base and p r i d i a n , i c , ,
Parcel No. 8:
Tc rK hnl'f of the West half of the Southwest quarter ot the Southeast q, iarL ir
Tnc South half of the west n a u
a n d M e r i d i
, ,f Section 36. Township 1 Sot ith, R mge 3 *.ast, Salt L
Parcel No- 9;:

• s-f; « ^ ST.. su ££r»r*s: siri;-2,T,
" -nnin5

a c

* {; " ^

'

„

rtM

nr

l p

--

r i S C of the Southwest corner of said

thence East 901 f e e t ; thence North 150 feet; thence East 51 1 f ^ c ,

more

J

I o the point of beginning, hereof.
Parcel No. 10:
Ih.

rKbc of ».y » d « . - » « .

, , ,„ p-,rrp,i ?lumber 1 and Parcel Number 2,
»™=^ " S „ ' " " ' T.1 r.cord.d a , Eatry »o.

Ss^r^*^ e K""*«--»»"«• °"°«"b" "• i56s e 9:25 "'•• °- R Parcel No. I l l

of way, as contained and described in u
I l l C r y S o . 106902, in Book M15, at Page 619, on. , , .

,

,

-n .

M

vO
CD
UJ
C3

NJ3

CD

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:

SsaA &.£-.
.12-5J t

^CO^y

^tt.ik..,c.d:,,.v

i::)p::ic:e .,. \ bo" 'e : oi: I \ecoi (Ier*s Use

WAF M: :;i!
JOSEPH I
I

Ill: E E D

KROFCHECK

I ui Angeles

hereby (j)NVEY

I I il

, grantor

„ Count) of Los Angeles, California

and WARRANT

, SEUa^UtattE

t:

SNYDERVILLE WES I , a P a r t n e r s h i p
, grantee
of

S a l t Lake City

, County of

Salt 1 ske

, Stale of Utah

for the sum of TEN A;,;: :;o/100 AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE C0NSDISRAT10N -DOLLARS,

the following described tract of land In

S u nun i t:
Comity , Slate of Utah, to-wit:
Part of the Southwest quarter of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, part •
of the Northwest quarter Section 6, Township 2 South, Range 4 East and a part of
Northeast quarter of Section 1, Township 2 South, Ranze 3 East of the Salt Lake Base
and Meridian described as follows: Beginning at the Southwest comer of Section
31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Summit County,
Utah, and running thence North along Section line 502.3 feet; thence East 850.00
feet; thence South 138.00 feet; thence West 482.80 fs2t; thence South
0°1V5S11
East 474.93 feet to the Southerly boundary of Seller's land; thence South 57*30f
West 32.8 feet; thence South 81 3 40' West 299.5 feet; thence North 27°28! West
100.6 feet to the West line of above mentioned Section 6; thence North 0 J 30' East
82.4 feet to point of beginning,
TOGETHER WITH AN EASEMENT FOR INGRESS, EGRESS & ttrSERGROl^T UTILITIES, to be usin common with other landowners in the said vicinity, described as follows:
BEGINNING at a point which is located on the Southerly boundary line of Park
City West Plat No. 1, equidistant between the Westerly and Easterly lines of
"Brook Ave," depicted on the official plat of said subdivision; Thence thirty
feet (30 ft.) each side of a centerlire which proceeds South frcoi said point of
beginning, for a distance of 891.00 feet, core or l = ss, to the South line of the
real property parcel described in the said foregoing grant herein; comprising a
roadway 60.00 feet in width for said purposes first irove mentioned.
W I T N E S S the hand of slid grantor , this
day of
19

Signed in the pi esence :)£

"V

T

•

J
STATE OF lfT^H,^L^.^r-v^..
County of ^ . - r ?

Cf-2^--

On the

£• C~C

personally appeared before me
tit e s i gr. e r

o f tl i i , bt i v< » i r 3 m in 1 c n:. ' " h c :i i 11 v :ic k no w I ed ged-: o rr.e tha L

.j
My commission expires i_lldr:r/.'.^^T— •...:

he

e x ecu I x:l ! h r •

Notary Public

...LLL-..Residing in . . ~ - T ^ C Z _ . ^ - n ^ J : -

^Lux -. ORTON - snz4bj
RTCHAPD DAVIS - #A0836
A 4, HAHOQN & LILJENQUIST
TORNEYS FOR

PLAINTIFF

8 8 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTM R CJZR
Ar L CI- *
fElEPHONF

UTAH H 4 1 0 1

'n^<" c--

- —n

' DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRENDA MAJOR WEBER,
Personal Representative
of the Estate of ROBERT
W MAJOR, J?., Deceased,
Plaintiff,

i'i y \ 1

ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a
Utah "V, r?oration , e t a 1,
Defendants.
HIMILATIUN

BRENDA MAJOR WEBER,
. ersonal Representai.,. ,.
*: the Estate of ROBERT
^AJOR, JR.. . Deceased,
Plaintiff,

SNYr^:- ILLE LAND CO.,- .:=
Utah I. ir\ ted Partnership ,
et ai t
Defendants.

J i \i< ihTTLEMENT

Plaintiff, Brenda Major Weber, Personal Representative
1

of the Estate of Robert W. Major, Jr., deceased, individually

2

and through her attorney, Robert F. Orton of the firm of Marsden,

3

Orton, Cahoon & Liljenquist; Defendant, Joseph L. Krofcheck,

4

also known as J. L. Krofcheck, individually, and Defendants,

5

J. L. Krofcheck, also known as Joseph L. Krofcheck, English

6

Inn Co., Inc., Park City Utah Corporation, Major-Blakeney

7

Corporation, Investor Associates Syndicate, William S. Richards,

8

Karl C. Lesueur, Wayland P. Calkins, Barbara Calkins, City

9

Development Corporation, Diana L. Lesueur, Z. J. Slagel, also

10

known as Zella J. Slagel, Ray Winn, New York Investors, Inc.,

11

Michael Spurlock, Dorie Spurlock, Maria Krofcheck, City

12

Development Company, Inc., Inn Investors, Title Insurance

13

Agency, Reese Howell, Joe Cox, Jim Gaddis, Sam Wilson, and

14

Henry Winkler, through their attorney, Don R. Strong of the

15

firm of Strong & Mitchell; Defendant, Snyderville Land Company,

16

through its general partners, Joseph L. Krofcheck and Jack E.

17

Roberts, and through its attorney, Don R. Strong of the firm

18

of Strong & Mitchell; Defendant, J. E. Roberts, also known as

19

Jack E. Roberts; Defendants, H. E. Babcock and J. E. Roberts,

20

d/b/a Park West Land Company, Halbet Properties, Inc., and

21

Snyderville Properties, Inc., through Jack E. Roberts, their

22

president and/or general partner; Defendants, Park West Associate

23
24

- 2 -

James C. Fogg, Walter J. Plumb/ III., and Richard D. Frost,
1

through their attorney, Walter J. Plumb, III.; and Defendant,

2

American Savings & Loan Association, through its attorney,

g

Theodore Boyer, Jr., of the firm of Clyde, Pratt & Gibbs,

A

hereby stipulate and agree:

g

WHEREAS, prior to his death, the Decedent, Robert W

g

Major, Jr., claimed, and Brenda Major Weber, as Personal Re-

7

presentative of said Robert W. Major, Jr., now claims, some

g

right, title and interest in and to the real properties located

9

in Summit County, State of Utah, and more particularly describee

10 I in Exhibits "A", "BM, and "C" which are attached hereto and by
H

this reference incorporated herein; and

12

WHEREAS, all of the Defendants above named, with the

13

exception of American Savings & Loan Association, have hereto-

14

fore claimed some right, title and interest in and to said real

15

properties, or parts thereof, and each of the following Defendan

16

now claims some right, title or interest in and to that portion

17

of said real property which is described in the Exhibit(s)

18

identified opposite his or its name, which such Exhibits are

19

attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein, to-wii

20

EXHIBIT NO.

21
22
I

CLAIMANT

"A", "B", "C"

Snyderv.ille Land Company

"C"

William S. Richards, Trustee,
and Park West Land Co.

23 I
24 j!

- 3 -

EXHIBIT NO.

CLAIMANT

"D"

Joseph L. Krofcneck

M

Park City Utah Corporation

E"

"F"

Joseph L. Krofcheck

"G"

English Inn Co., Inc.

"H"

Jack E. Roberts, Park West Land
Co. and Snyderville Properties, Inc

f,

I"

Park West Associates

and
WHEREAS, on or about the 9th day of June, 1982,
Defendants, J. E. Roberts, Snyderville Property

-5, Inc., Park

West Land C o . , Joseph L. Krofcheck, and Joseph Cox entered into
an Amended Limited Partnership Agreement amending the Limited
Partnership Agreement by which Snyderville Land Company, a Utah
Limited Partnership, was created.

By the terms of said agree-

ments, much of the real property described in Exhibits "A"
through " I " , inclusive, was conveyed by Defendant, Joseph L.
Krofcheck, to Snyderville Land Company, and Defendants, J. E.
Roberts, Snyderville Properties, Inc., Park West Land Co.
and Joseph Cox agreed to convey other real properties to said
Snyderville Land Company; and
WHEREAS, the ownership of Snyderville Land
represented by ONE THOUSAND

ompany is

(1,000) partnership units of which
- 4 -
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Joseph L. Krofcheck owns FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-TWO AND ONE-HALF
(492.5), Jack E. Roberts, Park West Land Co. and Snyderville

1

Properties, Inc., own FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-TWO AND ONE-HALF

2

(492.5), and Joseph Cox owns FIFTEEN (15); and

3

WHEREAS, Defendant, Frostwood Limited, heretofore

4

entered into a written contract to purchase from Defendant,

5

Park West Associates, the real property described in Exhibit

6

"I" which is attached hereto; and

7
ft

II

WHEREAS, Frostwood Limited has paid certain cash

q I sums to Park West Associates on said written contract, a part
10

of which sums have in turn been paid by Park West Associates

11

to Plaintiff and to Joseph L. Krofcheck, and is currently

12

being held in trust by Robert P. Orton and Don R. Strong,

13

attorneys for Plaintiff and said Defendant; and

14
15

WHEREAS, Frostwood Limited has defaulted on said
written contract and has forfeited its interest in and to said

IQ [J sums being held by said Robert F. Orton and Don R. Strong
17
18
19

and the real property described in Exhibit "I"; and
WHEREAS, Joseph L. Krofcheck owns a general partnership interest of approximately TWENTY-ONE PER CENT (21%) in

20 I Park West Associates; and
21
22

WHEREAS, Defendant, American Savings & Loan Association, claims no interest in and to the real properties

23
24

- 5 -

described in Exhibits "A" through "I"; and
WHEREAS, the parties hereto desire to settle -he
above-captioned actions and all of the issues raised by the
pleadings on file herein.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual
covenants and agreements hereinafter set forth and other good
and valuable consideration, IT IS AGREED:
1.

Snyderville Land Company shall quit-claim to

Joseph L. Krofcheck and English Inn Co., Inc., or designee(s),
all of its right, title and interest in and to that portion
of the real property described in Exhibit "A" which is a part
of Park City West, Plat 1, as recorded in the office of the
recorder of Summit County, State of Utah, and is situated
East of the East right-of-way line of Brook Avenue, South of
a line which is 290 feet North of the South boundary line of
said Park City West, Plat No. 1, and West of State Road 248,
and which contains six acres, more or less.

If, in order to

satisfy the legal rights, if any, of Richard Giauque, who
owns or claims to own a tract of land situated South of the tract
being conveyed to Joseph L. Krofcheck and English Inn Co., Inc.,
as aforesaid, it becomes necessary to provide a non-exclusive
easement running in a southerly direction from Park West Drive

- 6 -
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17.

Snyderville Land Company and its partners

represent to Plaintiff that Snyderville Land Company has no
1
debts or obligations other than as set forth in said Amended
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Q

Limited Partnership Agreement and any real property taxes
which have accrued since the formation of said partnership
and which are, as of the date hereof, unpaid.

The parties

agree that the THIRTY PER CENT (30%) interest in said partnership being assigned to Plaintiff, or designee(s), as aforesaid, and all of the properties, both real and personal, ownec
| by Snyderville Land Company or to be conveyed or assigned to

10

Snyderville Land Company under the provisions of this Stipula-

11

tion, are free of all liens, encumbrances, charges and defects

12

of any kind whatsoever except those hereinabove identified in

13

this paragraph numbered 17.

14

have accrued since the formation of said partnership, and whic.

All real property taxes which

ig | are unpaid at the date hereof, assessed against the real pro16

perty which will be owned by said partnership under the terms

17

of this agreement, shall be paid from partner contributions

18 I based on the per cent of total partnership units owned by each
19
20

contributing partner.
18.

The parties agree to the entry of an Order adjuc

21

ing and decreeing that Snyderville Land Company is the owner ir

22

fee simple and entitled to possession of all of the real proper

23 I situated in Summit County, State of Utah, and more particularly
24 1 described in Exhibits "P" and "Q" which are attached
- 14 -

hereto and by this reference made a part hereof and that
1

Plaintiff is the owner in fee simple and entitled to possession

2

of all of the real property situated in Summit County, State

3

of Utah, and more particularly described in Exhibit "R" which

4

is attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof;

5

and further adjudging and decreeing that the claims of all

6

other parties to this action to any right, title and interest in

7

and to said real properties, and any part thereof, are without

8

any right whatever and that said parties have no right to or

9

interest in said real properties, or any part thereof.

10

19. Each party hereto hereby agrees to execute and

11

deliver such deeds, assignments, easements and other documents

12

as cire reasonably necessary to consummate the agreement of the

13

parties.

14 I

20.

In the event that any party breaches any of

15 J

the terms or conditions of this Stipulation For Settlement

16

and any other party brings suit to enforce the same or for

17

damages, the prevailing party shall be entitled to a reasonable

18

attorney's fee, to be determined by the Court, and the losing

19

party agrees to pay the same.

20
21

21.

This Agreement is subject to approval by the

Third Judicial District Court of Summit County, State of

22
23
24

15 -
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Utah, which is supervising the probate of the estate of Robert
1
2

W. Major, Jr., deceased.
22.

Upon approval of this Agreement by the Third

3

Judicial District Court of Summit County, State of Utah, as

4

aforesaid, upon the entry of a judgment or order pursuant to

5

the terms hereof, and upon execution and delivery of the

6

documents and properties referred to herein, the above-captioned

7

actions may be dismissed, except as herein provided.

8

DATED this £ ^

day of (f)c'A^

'

1985

'

9
10
ROBERT F. ORTON
T. RICHARD DAVIS
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & LILJENQUISr
Attorneys for Plaintiff

11
12
13
14
15
16

P\jyyJL^
YilnJM. l\lAtA
BRENDA MAJOR WEBER,/fPersonal
Representative of line Estate
of Robert W. Major, Jr.,
deceased

17
18
DON R. STRONG
STRONG & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Defendants, Joseph
L. Krofcheck, Snyderville Land
Company, et al

19
20
21
22
23

jpjSEPff L. KROFCHECK

24
-

16

-

SNYDERVILLE LAND COMPANY:

BY
V
J. E. ROBERTS, General Partner

JOSEPH L. KROFCHECK^ General
Partner

WALTS R^L^-PLUMB, II.
Attorney for Defendants, Park
West VAysociates, et al

^f?d7ffVL

THEODOKETBOYER, JR.

CLYDE, PRATT & GIBBS
Attorneys for Defendant, American
Savings & Loan Association

QffUfcUP
J. E^ROBE^TS, also known as
JACK'E. ROBERTS

PARK WEST LAND CO.

BY

^\Mi/?Sr.P

J . ' E . /ROBERTS, G e n e r a l

-

17

049-

Partner

HALBET PROPERTIES,

BY v .

INC.

2 7 )5?
/A

J. ET ROBERTS/ President
President

SNYDERVILLE PROPERTIES, INC.

J./E. ROBERTS/, President

18 -
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EXHIBIT "R"

All of the real property situated in Summit County,
State of Utahf and particularly described in Exhibits "A"
and "B" which are attached to the Stipulation For Settlement to which this Exhibit "R" is attached.
EXCEPTING, the tract of land described in paragraph
numbered 1 of said Stipulation For Settlement which is
being quit-claimed by Snyderville Land Company to Joseph
L. Krofcheck and English Inn Co., Inc., and the tracts
of land described in Exhibits " D \ "E", "F", "G", "H",
"I", "0", "P" and "Q" which are attached to said Stipulation For Settlement.

n^oj:

EXHIBIT MAtr

Parcel No- 1:
Lot A, Lots 18 thru 19, 22 thru 24, 28 thru 38, PAPJC CITY irEST SUBDIVISION
K0„ 1, according to the official plat thereof on file and of record in the
office of the Summit County Recorder, State of Utah*
Parcel No, 2:
Lots 1 thru 4 , 17 thru 2 5 , PARK CITY WEST SUBDIVISION NO, 2 , according t o t h e
o f f i c i a l p l a t thereof on f i l e and of record i n the o f f i c e o f t h e Suirait Count1
Recorder, S t a t e of Utah* A l s o , THE HALL, PARK CITY BEST SUBDIVISION UQm 2*
P a r c e l No. 3 :
In Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridianr
Beginning at a point which is the NW corner of property conveyed to Spencer
Osborne et ux., in a Special Warranty Deed recorded March 31 > 1969, as Entry
No. 108801, in Book K-20, page 389, O.K., said point being on the North line o
said fection 1; thence West *:.Iong said section line 432 feet; thence Soutn 1°
50* East 715 feet; thence East 410 feet, nore or less^ to a point which is
directly South of the aforesaid beginning point; thence North in a straight
line to the said point of beginning 713 feet, more or less. TOGETHER WITH
an Easenent for ingress, egress and underground utilities BS set forth in the
first paragraph on page 5 of that certain Judgu^nt on Stipulation recorded as
Entry No. 113601, Book M-32, pages 269-276, on July 26, 1971.
Parcel Ko» 4:
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian:
The North 155 feet of the SW 1/4 of the KE 1/4 of the SU 1/4 of Section 36;
and the South 1/2 of the KW 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SW 1/4 of Section 36;
and the Vest 100 feet of the.N 1/2 of the SW 1/4 of the NW 1/4 of the SE 1/4
of Section 36; and the North 330 feet of the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of the SU
1/4 of Section 36 • TOGETHER. WITH an Easecent for ingress, egress and underground utilities as set forth in the second paragraph on page 5 of that certain Judgnent on Stipulation recorded as Entry Ko* 113601, Book M-32, pages
269-276, on July 26, 1971.
Parcel No. 5:
In Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian:
Beginning at the Southeast comer of Lot 25, Park City Uest Plat No. 2; thence
North along the East line of said Plat No. 2 for 204 feet; thence East 160
feet; thence South 204.00 feet; thence in a straight line West to the point of
beginning. TOGETHER WITH an Easement 27.6 feet wide for ingress, egress and
underground utilities, over a land strip lying 13.8 feet each side of a centerline commencing at a point which is 173.8 feet East of the Southeast corner of
Lot 25, Park City Uest Plat No. 2; thence 6S0.6 feet North, more or less, to
a right of way south line, which right of way.is known as "Major Drive" within
said Park City Uest Plat Ko. 2, connecting with Park City UesL Plat Ko. 1. said
plats bein?. recorded QITV.^^*^*— -•- -•

P a r c e l Ko. 6:
Part of the Southt/est quarter of Section 3 1 , Toimship 1 Sourh, Kange 4 Kast ,
pact of the Koith^est quarter Section 6, Township 2 South, Rango* 4 East > and
part of Kortheas.t quarter of Section 1, Township ? South, Range* 3 East of t h e
S a l t Lake Base and Meridian described as f o l l o w s : Beginning a t the Southwest
corner of Section 3 1 , Toi/nship 1 South, Range 4 East, S a l t Lake Base and f i e r i d i a n , Sucinit County, Utah, and running thence North along S e c t i o n l i
502.3
f e e t ; thence East 850.00 f e e t ; thence South 138.00 f e e t ; t h e n c e Uest .S2.S0
f e e t ; thance South 0°17 f 5S" East 474.93 f e e t to the S o u t h e r l y bounds y of S e l l e r 1
l a n d ; thence South 57°30 f West 32.8 f e e t ; thence South Sl^'iO* UesL 299.5 f e e t ;
thence llorch 27 0 28* Uest 100.6 f e e t to the Uest l i n e of t h e above mentioned
S e c t i o n ; thence North 0 o 30 f . Eai,t 82.4 f e e t to the point o f b e g i n n i n g .
o
++0

P a r c e l ?*o- 7:
Th** S o u t h e a s t quarter o f the Southwest quarter of S e c t i o n 36, To*niship 1 S o u t h ,
Kanje 3 E a s t , S a l t Lake Base and Meridian, l e s s the North 594.0 f e e t t h e r e o f .
P a r c e l No. 8:
The South h a l f o f the Uest h a l f o f the Southwest quarter o f the Southeast q u a r t e r
o f S e c t i o n 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, S a l t Lake Base and Meridian~
P a r c e l Ko,

g

:

In Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian,
Beginning at a point on the Uest line of State Highway 248, which point is 2,608.!
feet North and 1,412.0 feet, more or less, East of the Southwest corner of said
Section 31; thence Northerly along the said Uest line of Highway 248 for 383.5
feet; thence Uest 1,412.0 feet, nore or less, to a poin on the Uest line of said
Section 31; thence South 538.5 feet, nore or less, along said Section 31 Uest lin
thence East 901 feet; thence North 150 feet; thence East 511 feet, more or less,
to the point of beginning hereof•
Parcel No» 10:
The r i g h t o f way and e a s e n s n t , i n c l u d i n g P a r c e l Nunber 1 and P a r c e l Number 2 ,
c o n t a i n e d and d e s c r i b e d i n that c e r t a i n Uarranty Deed recorded a s Entry No_
1 0 8 2 8 3 , irv Book M-19> a t Pages 195-196, on December 1 9 , 1968 Q 9x25 AJrU, O.R.
P a r c e l No. 1 1 :
M l of the real" property, together with a perpetual 76 foot easement and right
of way, as contained and described in that certain Uarranty Deed recorded as
Entry Ko. 106902, in Book M 5 , at Page 619, on April 8, 1968, @ 9:13 A.1I.

EX "A" P. 2
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EXHIBIT "B"

Parcel A - A portion of Section 31, T1S, R4E, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian, Utah, as follows: Lots 25, 26,
and 27 of Park City West Plat No. 1, EXCEPTING from
said lots the southerly 1.3 feet (which lies within
a 7 foot easement for utilities.
Parcel B - Beginning at the Southeast corner of the
Southwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of the Southeast
1/4 of Section 36 T1S, R3E, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian; thence North 572.4 feet, thence East 761
feet, thence South 572.4 feet, thence West 761 feet
to the point of beginning:
EXCEPTING therefrom that portion of the aforedescribed
property which is included within Park City West Plat
Nc. 7 as recorded (Entry No. 110560) with the Summit
County Recorder on February 2, 1970.
Parcel C - Beginning at a point on the Section line 1254
feet North of the Southwest corner of Section 31, T1S,
R4E, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, thence East 850 feet,
thence South 239.22 feet, thence West 850 feet, thence
North 239.22 feet to the point of beginning.
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ROBERT F. ORTON - #A248 3
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & LILJENQUIST
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
68 SOUTH MAIN, FIFTH FLOOR, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3800
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BRENDA MAJOR WEBER, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR.,
Deceased,
Civil No. 7600

Plaintiff,
vs.
SNYDERVILLE LAND CO., a Utah
Limited Partnership;
SNYDERVILLE PROPERTIES, IIJC,
a Utah Corporation; J. E.
ROBERTS; JOSEPH L. KROFCHECK;
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a Utan
Corporation; WILLIAM S.
RICHARDS, Trustee; NATIONAL
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., a
i Utan Corporation; PARK WEST
ASSOCIATES, a Utah General
Partnership; JAMES C. FOGG;
WALTER J. PLUMB, III;
RICHARD D. FROST; and JOHN
DOES 1 through 24,

J

Defendants.
JUDGMENT
BRENDA MAJOR WEBER, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of ROBERT W. MAJOR, JR.,
Deceased,
Civil No. 7325

Plaintiff,
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vs.
ENGLISH INN CO., INC., a Utah
Corporation; PARK CITY UTAH
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation; SNYDERVILLE LAND CO.,
a Utah Limited Partnership;
CHARLES E. HIRSCH; HAROLD D.
HIRSCH; SAM A. HEPNER; EUGENE
H. POWERT; MASASHI HASHIDA;
J. E. ROBERTS a/k/a JACK E.
ROBERTS; FROSTWOOD LIMITED, a
Utah Limited Partnership;
J. L. KROFCHECK a/k/a JOSEPH
L. KROFCHECK; ROBERT L.
BARRETT; SNYDERVILLE WEST;
PARTNERSHIP INVESTMENT OF
COLORADO, INC., a Corporation;
PARK WEST WATER ASSOCIATION,
a Utah Non-Profit Corporation;
HALBET ENGINEERING, INC., a
California Corporation;
HALBET PROPERTIES, INC., a
Utah Corporation; MAJORBLAKENEY CORPORATION, a
California Corporation; ASPEN
GROVE, INC., a Utah Corporation; LESTER F. HEWLETT,
JR.; RUTH BRAZIER HEWLETT;
H. E. BABCOCK and J. E.
ROBERTS d/b/a PARKWEST LAND
COMPANY; INVESTOR ASSOCIATES
SYNDICATE, a Delaware Unincorporated Association;
WILLIAM S. RICHARDS; MURRAY
FIRST THRIFT AND LOAN COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; J. ROBERT
WEST; LIFE RESOURCES, INC.,
an Oregon Corporation; KARL
C. LESUEUR; H. J. SAPERSTEIN,
Trustee; PEOPLES FINANCE &
THRIFT COMPANY OF SALT LAKE
CITY, a Utah Corporation;
WAYLAND P. CALKINS; BARBARA
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CALKINS; McGHIE LAND TITLE
:
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation,
Trustee; AVCO FINANCIAL
:
SERVICES OF UTAH, INC., a Utah
Corporation; JOHN CANEPARI;
KERRY D. BODILY; SKI PARK
:
CITY WEST, INC., a Utah
Corporation; NATIONAL
:
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
INC., a Utah Corporation;
:
ENSIGN COMPANY, a California
Limited Partnership; ROBERT
W. ENSIGN; CITY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, a Corporation;
:
WESTERN STATES TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation; J. TAYLOR :
LOTT a/k/a JOHN TAYLOR LOTT;
UTAH TITLE & ABSTRACT COMPANY,:
a Utah Corporation; PARK WEST
ASSOCIATES, a Utah General
:
Partnership; JAMES WEBSTER
ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah
:
Corporation; JAY BAKER d/b/a
JAY BAKER ELECTRIC; RYDER
:
STILLWELL; DIANA L. LESUEUR;
Z. J. SLAGEL a/k/a ZELLA J.
:
SLAGEL? RAY WINN; JOHN MULLER;
GERALD W. WALTERS; NEW YORK
:
INVESTORS, INC., a New York
Corporation; MICHAEL SPURLOCK;:
DORIE SPURLOCK; MARIA
KROFCHECK; JOHN DOES 1
:
through 24, inclusive; and
all other persons unknown
:
claiming any right, title or
interest in or lien against
:
the real property described
in Plaintiff's Complaint ad- :
verse to Plaintiff's ownership
or clouding her title thereto;:
PARK CITY WEST ASSOCIATION,
a Utah Corporation; CITY
:
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DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., a Utah
Corporation; STANDARD INVESTMENT CORPORATION, a California
Corporation; GREAT NORTHERN
LAND CORPORATION, a California
Corporation; INN INVESTORS,
a Partnership; TITLE INSURANCE AGENCY, a Utah
Corporation; REESE HOWELL;
AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN, a
Utah Corporation; JOE COX;
JIM GADDIS; SAM WILSON; HENRY
WINKLER; and JOHN DOES 2 5
through 50, inclusive,
Defendants.

Plaintiff!s Motion For Entry of Final Judgment came
on regularly for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis
Frederick, one of the judges of the above-entitled Court, on
the

of January, 1986, Plaintiff being represented

in Court by her attorney, Robert F. Orton of the firm of
Marsden, Orton, Cahoon & Liljenquist, and none of the Defendants being present in Court nor represented by counsel; and
this Court, on the 29th day of August, 1985, in the abovereferenced civil action No. 7325, having duly and regularly
entered Judgment And Order On Plaintiffs Motions For Judgment
By Default And For Order Adjuding And Decreeing That Parties
Who Have Filed Disclaimers Have No Interest In Real Properties
Which Are The Subject Matter Of This Action, adjudging and
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decreeing that neither the following named Defendants, nor
anyone claiming by, through or under them, has any right to
or interest in the real properties which are the subject matter
of said action, to-wit:

Eugene H. Powert; Masashi Hashida;

Robert L. Barrett; Snyderville West; Partnership Investment
of Colorado, Inc.; Park West Water Association; Halbet Engineering,
Inc.; Aspen Grove, Inc.; Avco Financial Services of Utah, Inc.;
John Canepari; Kerry D. Bodily; Ski Park City West, Inc.;
National Property Management, Inc.; Ensign Company; Robert W.
Ensign; Ryder Stillwell; John Muller; Park City West Association;
Standard Investment Corporation; Great Northern Land Corporation;
Charles E. Hirsch; Harold D. Hirsch; Sam A. Hepner; Lester F.
Hewlett, Jr.; Ruth Brazier Hewlett; J. Robert West; Life
Resources, Inc.; H. J. Saperstein, Trustee; Peoples Finance &
Thrift Company of Salt Lake City; McGhie Land Title Company;
Western States Title Company; J. Taylor Lott a/k/a John Taylor
Lott; Utah Title & Abstract Company; James Webster Associates,
Inc.; Jay Baker d/b/a Jay Baker Electric; and Gerald W.
Walters, and permanently enjoining said parties from asserting
any adverse claim to said real properties, and any part thereof,
and from interferring with the title to and possession and use
of said real properties by Plaintiff and the heirs of the
decedent, Robert W. Major, Jr.; and this Court, on the 21st
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day of November, 1985, in the above-referenced civil action No.
7325, having entered Judgment And Order On Plaintiff's Motion
For Order Adjudging And Decreeing That Defendant, First Security
Financial, As Successor To Murray First Thrift And Loan Company,
Has No Interest In The Real Properties Which Are The Subject
Matter Of This Action, adjudging and decreeing that neither the
Defendant, First Security Financial, as Successor to Murray
First Thrift and Loan Company, nor anyone claiming by, through
or under it, has any right to or interest in the real properties
which are the subject matter of said action and that said
Defendant, and all claiming by, through and under it, be and are
hereby permanently enjoined from asserting any adverse claim to
said real properties, and any part thereof, and from interferring
with the title to and possession and use of said real properties
by Plaintiff and the heirs of the decedent, Robert W. Major, Jr.;
and this Court, on the 29th day of August, 1985, in the abovereferenced civil action No. 7600, having duly and regularly
entered Judgment And Order On Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment
By Default, adjudging and decreeing that neither the Defendant,
National Property Management, Inc., nor any person claiming by,
through or under it, has any right, title or interest in and to
the real properties which are the subject matter of said action
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and permanently enjoining said Defendant from asserting any
adverse claim to said real property, and any part thereof, and
from interferring with the title to and the possession and use
of said real property by Plaintiff and the heirs of the decedent,
Robert W. Major, Jr.; and the Plaintiff, Brenda Major Weber,
Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert W. Major, Jr.,
deceased, and ail of the remainding Defendants named in the
above-referenced actions having, on the 2nd day of October,
1985, entered into a Stipulation For Settlement by the terms
of which all of the issues raised by the pleadings on file
herein were fully adjusted, compromised and settled and
by the further terms of which it was agreed that a Final Judgment
in form and as hereinafter set forth could be entered by this
Court; and duplicate originals of said Stipulation For Settlement being filed herewith; and this Court which is supervising
the probate of the estate of Robert W. Major, Jr., deceased,
Probate No. 2000, having, on the 15th day of November, 1985,
entered its Order Authorizing Compromise and Settlement of
Disputed Claims in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
numbered 21 at pages 15 and 16 of said Stipulation For
Settlement; and no notice of hearing on Plaintiff's Motion For
Entry of Final Judgment being required by reason of said
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Judgments and Orders and said Stipulation For Settlement; and
the Court having reviewed and studied said Stipulation For
Settlement and the other pleadings and papers on file herein
and being fully advised in the premises and good cause
appearing,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED:
1.

Defendant, Snyderville Land Co., is the owner

in fee simple and entitled to possession of all of the real
property situated in Summit County, State of Utah, and more
particularly described in Exhibits "A" and "B" which are
attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof.
2.

Plaintiff, Brenda Major Weber, as Personal

Representative of the Estate of Robert W. Major, Jr., deceased,
is the owner in fee simple and entitled to possession of all
of the reaL property situated in Summit County, State of Utah,
and more particularly described in Exhibit "C" which is
attached hereto and by this reference made a part hereof.
3.

The claims of all of the Defendants named in the

above and foregoing actions, and all claiming by, through or
under them, with the exception of Defendant, Snyderville Land
Co., as aforesaid, to any right, title and interest in and to
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the real properties described in Exhibits "A", "B", and "C",
as aforesaid, and any part thereof, are without any right
whatever and said parties have no right to or interest in said
real properties, and any part thereof.
4.

Snyderville Land Co. shall immediately quit-

claim to Joseph L. Krofcheck and English Inn Co., Inc., or
designee(s), all of its right, title and interest in and to
that portion of the real property described in Exhibits "A11
and "B" which is a part of Park City West, Plat 1, as recorded
in the office of the recorder of Summit County, State of Utah,
and is situated East of the East right-of-way line of Brook
Avenue, South of a line which is 2 90 feet North of the South
boundary line of said Park City West, Plat No. 1, and West of
State Road 224, sometimes referred to in the records of Summit
County as State Road 248, and which contains six acres, more
or less.

If, in order to satisfy the legal rights, if any, of

Richard Giauque, who owns or claims to own a tract of land
situated South of the tract being conveyed to Joseph L. Krofcheck
and English Inn Co., Inc., as aforesaid, it becomes necessary
to provide a non-exclusive easement running in a southerly
direction from Park West Drive to Mr. Giauque f s property,
Snyderville Land Co. snail CLD so.
5.

All of tne parties who have signed said Stipulation
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and properties referred to herein, the above-captioned actions
shall, upon application of any party hereto supported by
proof of execution and delivery, as aforesaid, be dismissed
except as herein otherwise provided.
DATED this __J^C^day

of January, 1986.
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The foregoing Judgment is approved as to form and
content by the undersigned parties, individually and/or through
counsel, this

//)

day of January, 1986.

ROBERT F. ORTON
MARSDEN, ORTON, CAHOON & LILJENQUIST
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DON R. STRONG
STRONG & MITCHELL
Attorneys for Defendants, Snyderville Land Co,, J. L. Krofcheck,
also known as Joseph L. Krofcheck,
English Inn Co., Inc., Park City
Utah Corporation, Major-Blakeney
Corporation, Investor Associates
Syndicate, William S. Richards,
Karl C. Lesueur, Wayland P. Calkins,
Barbara Calkins, City Development
Corporation, Diana L. Lesueur,
Z. J. Slagel, also known as Zella
J. Slagel, Ray Winn, New York
Investors, Inc., Michael Spurlock,
Dorie Spurlock, Maria Krofcheck,
City Development Company, Inc.,
Inn Investors, Title Insurance
Agency, Reese Howell, Joe Cox,
Jim Gaddis, Sam Wilson and Henry
Winkler

/J.JE. ROBERTS
General Partner

>

toTER J. PLUMB, III
Attorney for Defendants, Park
West Associates, James C. Fogg,
Walter J. Plumb, III, and Richard
D. Frost

Wl'-

hf cd cx^
THEODORE BOYER, JR.
CLYDE & PRATT
Attorneys for Defendant, American
Savings & Loan Association

(A

*L$u3tP

". EL ROB0RTS, also known as
FACK E. ROBERTS
PARK WEST LAND CO.

C. E. ROBERTS
General Partner
HALBET PROPERTIES, INC.

BY
BERTS, President
SNYDERVILLE PROPERTIES, INC.
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,'J. IE7 ROBERTS^

i
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President

EXHIBIT "C"

PARCEL NO. 1:
The West 100 feet of the North 1/2 of
the Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter
of the Southeast quarter of Section 36, Township 1 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
TOGETHER WITH, an easement for ingress,
egress and underground utilities as set forth
in the second paragraph on page 5 of that
certain Judgment on Stipulation recorded as
Entry No, 113601, Book M-32, pages 269-276,
on July 26, 1971.
PARCEL NO. 2:
Part of the Southwest quarter of Section
31, Township 1 South, Range 4 East, part of
the Northwest quarter of Section 6, Township 2
South, Range 4 East, part of the Northeast
quarter of Section 1, Township 2 South, Range
3 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian described as follows: Beginning at the Southwest
corner of Section 31, Township 1 South, Range 4
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Summit County,
Utah, and running thence North along Section line
502.3 feet; thence East 850.00 feet; thence
South 138.00 feet; thence West 482.80 feet;
thence South 0° 17' 58" East 474.93 feet to the
Southerly boundary of Seller!s land; thence
South 57° 30f West 32.8 feet; thence South 81°
401 West 299.5 feet; thence North 27° 28 1 West
100.6 feet to the West line of the above mentioned
Section; thence North 0° 30f East 82.4 feet to
the point of beginning.
TOGETHER WITH AND SUBJECT TO, easements of
record or enforceable in law or equity.
PARCEL NO. 3;
The right of way and easement, including
Parcel Number 1 and Parcel Number 2, contained
and described in that certain Warranty Deed
recorded as Entry No. 106283, in Book M-19, at
pages 195-196, on December 19, 1968 at 9:25 A.M.,

6.R.

PARCEL NO. 4:
All of the real property, together with a
perpetual 76 foot easement and right of way, as
contained and described in that certain Warranty
Deed recorded as Entry No, 106902, in Book M15,
at page 619, on April 8, 1968, at 9:13 A.M.
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